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ABSTRACT Monterey, California 92
For some time there has been controversy about and an increasing
amount of attention to business costs which have been labeled as inde-
pendent research and development (IR&D) and bid and proposal (R&P) costs.
This thesis examines these costs in order to bring clearer understanding
to vrhat they are, why they are undertaken, how they are accounted for,
and how they should be managed and paid for. This is accomplished by
reviewing the objectives of IR&D and B&P costs, examining the past and
present environment in which these efforts have been and are being con-
ducted, and identifying issues and problems confronting both industry
and Government. Because the Department of Defense is the largest Govern-
ment procurer, emphasis is placed on its policies and procedures and the
effects they have on industry.
Research for this thesis was conducted by (l) review of related lit-
erature, (2) interviews with knowledgeable personnel, and (3) a question-
naire which was sent to personnel in Government and industry who are di-
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I. INTRODUCTION
For some time there has been controversy about and an increasing
amount of attention to business costs which have been labeled as inde-
pendent research and development (iR&D) and bid and proposal (B&P) costs.
Because of the diversity of viewpoints indicated by the various interested
parties with respect to the Government's treatment, which is prescribed
by statutes and regulations, it is evident that there is much lack of a-
greement as to the nature and purpose of these costs.
The intent of this thesis is to examine these costs in order to bring
clearer understanding to what they are, why they are undertaken, and how
they should be managed and paid for. This is accomplished by reviewing
the objectives of IR&D and B&P costs, examining the past and present en-
vironment in which these efforts have been and are being conducted, and
identifying issues and problems confronting both industry and Government.
Because the Department of Defense is the largest Government procurer, em-
phasis is placed on its policies and procedures and the effects they have
on industry.
Research for this paper has been conducted by (i) review of related
literature, (ii) interviews with knowledgeable personnel, and (iii) a
questionnaire which was sent to personnel in Government and industry who
are directly involved with these costs.
The IR&D and B&P questionnaire (included as Appendix A) was designed
as a research tool to determine certain approaches, preferences, and at-
titudes about statements relevant to accounting for IR&D and B&P costs.
Respondents were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with statements
related to present procedures and to possible improvements for the future.

The written questionnaires were distributed to 69 of the nation's
largest industrial Government contractors believed to have an interest
in the Government's policies and procedures related to IR&D and B&P costs.
An additional 30 questionnaires were distributed to Government contracting
officers who were directly associated with Government policies and prac-
tices related to IR&D and B&P costs.
The data collected from returned questionnaires were tabulated, sum-
marized and processed on an IBM 360/67 computer at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California. The computer program used to compile the
data was the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Fre-
quency distributions were made of the data. Where appropriate and pos-
sible, statistical measures were calculated. The results were used for
evaluation and they are included in Appendix A.
Classification of returned questionnaires by size of company, line
of business and experience with Government contracts indicated that re-
turns represented a fairly broad scope of contractors. The general tone
of the responses was cooperative and constructive.
The overall response was ^3.5 percent from industry and 60.0 percent
from Government personnel. Interpretation of responses to the question-
naire posed some difficulty. In some cases, categorical answers were
qualified in accompanying narrative comment. Balancing comments against
tabulations of bare categorical replies constituted a significant problem
in interpreting data.
A. WHAT ARE INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (IR&D) AND BID AND PRO-
POSAL (B&D) COSTS?
Independent research and development is defined as follows [Armed
Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) Section 15-205.35, 1973]:

A contractor's independent research and development effort (IR&D) is that
technical effort which is not sponsored by, or required in performance
of, a contract or grant and which consists of projects falling within the
following three areas: (i) basic and applied research, (ii) development,
and (iii) systems and other concept formulation studies. IR&D effort
shall not include technical effort expended in the development and pre-
paration of technical data specifically to support the submission of a
bid or proposal. For the purposes of this paragraph:
(1) Basic Research is that research which is directed toward increase
of knowledge in science. The primary aim of basic research is a fuller
lonnwl pdgR ot understanding of the subject under study, rather than any
practical application thereof.
(2) Applied Research is that effort which (a) normally follows basic
research, but may not be severable from the related basic research, (b)
attempts to determine and exploit the potential of scientifi c discoveries
or improvements in technology, materials, processes, methods, devices, or
techniques, and (c) attempts to advance the state of the art. Applied
research does not include efforts whose principal aim is design, develop-
ment, or test of specific items or services to be considered for sale;
these efforts are within the definition of the term "development," defined
below.
(3) Development is the systematic use, under whatever name, of scien-
tific and technical knowledge in the design, development, test, or eval-
uation of a potential new product or service (or of an improvement in an
existing product or service) for the purpose of meeting specific per-
formance requirements or objectives. Development shall include the func-
tions of design engineering, prototyping, and engineering testing.
(k) Systems and other concept formulation studies are analyses and_
study efforts^ either related to specific IR&D efforts or directed toward
the identification of desirable new systems, equipments or components,
or desirable modifications and improvements to existing systems, equip-
ments, or components.
(5) Company includes all divisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates of
the contractor under common control.
Bid and proposal costs are defined as follows [ASPR Section 15-205. 3
1
1973]:
Bid and proposal (B&P) costs are the costs incurred in preparing, submit-
ting, and supporting bids and proposals (whether or not solicited) on
potential Government or non-Government contracts which fall within the
following:
(l) Administrative costs including the cost of the nontechnical ef-
fort for the physical preparation of the technical proposal documents and
also the cost of the technical and nontechnical effort for the preparation
and publication of the cost data and other administrative data necessary
to support the contractor's bids and proposals, and

(2) Technical costs incurred to specifically support a contractor's
"bid or proposal i including the costs of system and concept formulation
studies and the development of engineering and production engineering
data.
The term IR&D refers to that part of a contractor's total research
and development program which is not under a direct contract or grant and
is an effort which is planned, sponsored, and directed internally. It is
essentially a company's self-initiated research and development program
performed in areas selected at its discretion and is undertaken to help
it to he in a position to produce new or improved techniques, information,
concepts, and products. Generally, IR&D is more relevant to the future
business of the company than to its current production and may not be di-
rectly related to the Government as a potential customer. It is recog-
nized as a normal and necessary function of business.
Other technical and engineering activities of a company, such as those
involved in developing contract bids and proposals, are often quite simi-
lar to the technical and engineering activities performed under IR&D pro-
grams. They are distinguished by the purpose for which the work is being
conducted. IR&D is conducted to maintain or advance the technological
capability of the company, whereas B&P is conducted to convince the buyer
that the company is the most capable supplier for a particular need. B&P
is so closely related to IR&D that it must necessarily be considered in
any discussions or deliberations concerning that subject. Hence, unless
otherwise indicated, any discussion of IR&D in this paper may be assumed
to have similar application to B&P.
When the sealed-bid, fixed-price technique of Government procurement
can be used, IR&D and B&P costs are presumably included in the quoted
price and not usually questioned because the purely competitive situa-
tion automatically controls the amount of reimbursement for direct and
8

indirect costs. Pure competition may be defined as follows [^Harris, 195&I
P. 313]:
A market is purely competitive if there are so many buyers and sellers
of an essentially identical product that no one can have an appreciable
influence on price by varying the amount he offers to buy or sell , and
if firms can enter or leave freely in response to market forces.
However, in many situations where the Government may be the only buyer
of specialized products and services, the automatic control by the compet-
itive marketplace is not possible and the appropriate amount of cost re-
imbursement for IR&D and B&P is not clear-cut. In these situations the
Government does influence price by varying the amount it offers to buy,
and firms cannot leave the market freely. The necessity of cost con-
straints in this specialized marketplace has led to the development of
surrogate controls to replace those inherent in the price-competitive
marketplace.
The surrogate controls — such as requiring the contractor to submit
brochures describing planned programs, conducting technical evaluations
of such planned programs, negotiating the extent of Government cost par-
ticipation in advance of cost incurrence, and requiring cost sharing by
the contractor — have been developed to determine the amount of IR&D
which will be paid for by the Government. These controls continue to be
the focal point of much disagreement. IR&D and B&P costs are perplexing
issues because, while nearly everyone agrees that both are legitimate
cost elements of doing business, great controversy arises over the fine
line separating legitimacy and illegitimacy with respect to Government
recognition of these costs.
B. INNOVATION IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The value of IR&D can be seen by realizing the necessity of individual
companies, industry as a whole, military and other Government agencies,

and the entire nation having available a reservoir of advanced scientific
information and expertise to meet changing consumer and national needs.
This reserve of scientific knowledge must he more extensive and broader
than the problems which are immediately confronting the decision-makers.
Otherwise, it would not be able to suggest new directions in which the
solutions to presently unsolvable problems can be found. Because compa-
nies conduct research and development independently, they are able to in-
crease" greatly the breadth and depth of the technology base. Independence
is a vital factor in assuring successful and efficient performance of re-
search and development, and it gives companies the ability to react
promptly in order to expand, curtail, or redirect efforts in response to
technological discoveries, market demands and economic forces.
For people to be effective supporters and managers of science and
technology, it is essential that they understand innovation. They must
understand that it is a chain of events that stretches from an idea to a
socially valuable reality.
There is the "rational view" of innovation which sees it as being
similar to other major functions of an organization, such as marketing
or production, and considers it as a manageable process in which risks
are controlled by mechanisms of justification and review. Implicit in
this view is the notion that skilled men can anticipate and control the
risks of innovation. By a process of justification, decision, and opti-
mization, it is assumed that risk of innovation can be kept within bounds.
Risk is associated with probability, wherein it lends itself to quan-
titative expression. In the framework of cost-benefit analysis, the risk
of an innovation is measured by the known probabilities of the alterna-
tive possible outcomes of a project. The benefits of the project can
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then be expressed as an expected value, computed "by multiplying the
probability of each outcome by its payoff (gain or loss) and then summing
these products.
Uncertainty is quite another matter, in that a situation is uncer-
tain when it requires action but resists analysis of risks. For example,
a gambler takes a risk in an honest game of blackjack when, knowing the
odds, he calls for another card. But the same gambler, unsure of the
odds or unsure of the honesty of the game, is in a situation of uncer-
tainty.
Men involved in technical innovation in a corporation confront a sit-
uation in which the need for action is clear but in which it is by no
means clear what to do. The corporation is not designed for uncertainty
— where there are no clear objectives to reach, no measures of accom-
plishment, or where it is not clear what to try to control. A corpora-
tion cannot operate effectively in uncertainty, but is well equipped to
handle risk. Accordingly, the innovative work of a corporation consists
in converting uncertainty to risk [Allison, 1969> p. 120^].
Research and development may be characterized as the discovery and
application of innovative approaches to the solution of problems. The
ultimate goal may be a new or improved military system, a new approach
to housing or transportation, or a new approach to social or health prob-
lems. In any case, research and development is expected to lead to inno-
vative ideas.
C. THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PERFORMER
To produce innovative ideas and to carry them through to the point
where it is possible to evaluate whether further work is justified, re-
searchers must have a source of support which permits some truly independent
11

research arid development. For research workers outside the Federal
establishment, this takes the form of independent research and develop-
ment funds.
Who is the research and development performer? Psychiatrist Lawrence
S. Kubie identifies this creative person as possessing unique character-
istics [Allison, 1969» P. 9Js
The scientist and the engineer must first of all maintain mastery of an
enormous body of rapidly growing data, yet, at the same time, must be as
freely imaginative as the poet, the artist, or the musician.
He must also possess the capacity to direct his imaginative flights to
real goals, to test the degree to which they are consonant with the real
world, and, finally, to project them into the future for new uses.
There is no simple way to describe the very complex process by which
ideas are caused to occur and develop. Examining possible thought pro-
cesses of a research and development performer is useful in order to get
a feeling for how ideas become^ solutions to perceived needs.
For anything that will ever be seen as a new gadget, there have prob-
ably been a million other good ideas. The huge majority of ideas exist
for only a short period of time — about one to two seconds. If the brain
that had the idea is able to connect it to a problem, it will last for
about ten seconds. In that lifetime, the brain has to be able to guess
what the cost and benefit will be for the idea. If the brain is able to
get past this milestone, the idea will have about one hour of life. During
that time, if the brain with the idea is able to fulfill the basic need
of talking about it with a peer who is imaginative and respected by the
brain which had the idea, then the idea should live for at least a few
weeks. If, during that time, the idea is considered again, it should sur-
vive for an unlimited time. Having survived, the idea has about a 50 per-




In the industrial environment, concern for costs in relation to
benefits, or relevance, is of major importance. James Fisk, president of
Bell Telephone Laboratories, states [Allison, 1969 » P« 20]:
Among a thousand scientific problems, a hundred or so will be interesting,
but only one or two will be truly rewarding — both to the world of sci-
ence and to us. What we try to provide is the atmosphere that will make
selecting the one or two in a thousand a matter of individual responsi-
bility and essentially automatic.
The greatest capability that the industrial laboratory possesses is
the ability to exploit knowledge. There are four requirements for such
exploitation: (i) talent — in sufficient numbers and of sufficient dis-
ciplinary diversity to attack a broad spectrum of problems; (ii) an inti-
macy with the world of science; (iii) scientific sophistication — a sense
of what is intellectually promising and what should be explored; and (iv)
the ability to recognize and generate relevant advances in science and to
be able to bring together the various talents of scientists and engineers
who will carry the advance through research, development, manufacture,
and finally to market. This fourth requirement belongs mostly to indus-
try [Allison, 1969, p. 22].




In examining examples of successful translation of science into technol-
ogy, one is struck by the diversity of successful patterns and organiza-
tional structures. There are no simple formulas for success, and for
this reason success is most likely when laboratory management has wide
latitude in adapting and restructuring the organization to suit the par-
ticular problem areas or technologies with which it currently is dealing.
A second National Academy of Sciences study [Allison, 1969 » P« 11*0
found that freedom and success were frequent partners in creating success-
ful ideas. Furthermore, in most circumstances a critical element has been
that the research people be able to shift the directions of their work and
explore unanticipated but relevant paths and that such shifts be made at
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the discretion of the technical people themselves, without waiting for
review and approval by top management.
D. THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The need for IR&D can be considered from three vantage points: (i)
the private companies undertaking the technical effort, (ii) the customers
served by the private companies, and (iii) the nation — its strength,
progress, and well-being.
1, Private Companies
Private companies undertake IR&D to help insure their continuing
ability to respond to rapid changes in customer needs, in technologies
and in market requirements. IR&D is a vital, integral part of the en-
trepreneural efforts of the company which has a need to:
a. Provide new and improved products and services to serve short-
and long-range needs in present areas of business;
b. Realign company resources and efforts to better meet shifts
in national priorities and to meet changes in products and services which
are required by the Government and other customers;
c. Update the science and technology of the company in order to
serve existing and future customers efficiently in the areas of propos-
ing, estimating, and performing research and development;
d. Maintain reasonable stability in the company's total work-
load in order to minimize overhead charges and costly disruptive effects
upon the company and its employees, customers and others;
e. Achieve a competitive level of awareness of new knowledge in
chosen fields of technical activity in order to remain in a business which
depends heavily on technical innovation.
Ik

2. Customers of Private Industry
Customers of private industry must consider both the short- and
long-range needs and objectives with respect to the availability of com-
petent research and development. Specifically , the Department of Defense
(DOD), as well as other Government procuring agencies, must plan for re-
search and development in order to allocate resources efficiently for a
given technology as well as to advance technology.
Technological progress in the field of national security depends
mainly upon the success of research and development activities sponsored
by the military services and such closely related agencies of government
as the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. It is the nature of research that the researcher does
not know what he will discover. Hence, useful ideas can come from un-
sponsored research in the universities, private industrial laboratories,
and individual military and civilian inventors.
There can be no question concerning the crucial importance of
promoting military technology in the nuclear era. This importance is
emphasized by figure 1 [^Senate Armed Services Committee, Part 2, 1972,
P« 835] which indicates the resource allocation effort for military re-
search, development, test and evaluation by Russia in comparison with
that of the United States. Any power that lags significantly in mili-
tary technology, no matter how large its military budget or how effi-
ciently it allocates resources, is likely to be at the mercy of a more
progressive enemy. Keeping ahead in the technological race is not in it-
self a guarantee of security in these circumstances; it remains essential
to incorporate the technology in operational weapons and to deploy them
and use them with skill and intelligence. But no amount of production,
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Figure 1.
Source: Senate Armed Services Committee
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. , Director of Defense Research and Engi-
neering, has indicated [Senate Armed Services Committee, Part 1, 1970,
P» 357~] that research and development are essential to a prudent national
security effort because of the following factors:
a. Research and development provide a qualitative advantage re-
quired to compensate for any numerical inferiority that the United States
has or might suffer in troops or equipment and for any temporary disad-
vantage it might suffer should a numerically superior force take the ini-
tiative. If the United States can maintain its technical leadership, it
can achieve its goals — sometimes at lower costs — without necessarily
competing with the Soviet Union in total numbers of missiles or bombers
or troops. Thus, the quality of the United States' deterrent may be more
16

critical than its quantity. Without research and development there cannot
be the essential quality, now or in the future.
b. Knowledge creates options which the President may need during
a period of tension, during planning, or during negotiations. It is much
safer to know what might be feasible in weapons than to guess what a po-
tential enemy is capable of doing. This option creating function is im-
portant also because it permits the Defense Department to respond more
rapidly and effectively to large changes in national security policy,
when such changes are caused by increased or decreased tension. The United
States can be prepared to substitute new equipment for old if it will im-
prove the effectiveness of its forces — or of an arms-control agreement.
c. The nation needs as broad as possible a conceptual basis of
the arms race. It needs to act intelligently on national security, in-
cluding arms control, by considering the broadest possible range of tech-
nological possibilities. To cut the research and development program today
is, in effect, to claim great precision in predicting the nature of the
world in five to twenty years and to foreclose on the option of the na-
tion's future leaders who will have the responsibility for our national
security at that time. An honest attempt should be made to cut the costs
of the overall defense burden and to negotiate acceptable treaties limit-
ing weapons, but the country's leaders should not mortgage the future by
dismissing or misjudging the critical and growing need for defense re-
search and development.
The nation needs a sound technology base in order to solve, by
technical means and on a short time scale, urgent problems encountered
by the armed forces. It needs to be able to evaluate new defense con-
cepts and to select those of greatest potential value. It needs to ad-
vance technology across a broad front of military need. It needs to
17

provide improvements in the operations of the armed forces which will use
resources efficiently and increase personnel effectiveness.
The Defense Department's technological needs are so diverse and
today's technology is so sophisticated that DOD cannot alone have the wis-
dom and ability to judge all technical projects and approaches that may
produce beneficial results. IR&D enables the Department of Defense to
capitalize on American technological innovation by using the many tech-
nical brains in industry. Additionally, IR&D of the contractors may re-
sult in reduced costs to the Government because of exploratory work com-
pleted before the Government becomes committed to the execution of a
formal contract. It also allows the Government to compare different
technical approaches when more than one contractor is doing work in one
area, so that the best solution for a particular time and prevailing cir-
cumstances can be chosen.
3. National Interests
Overall national interests in a technically strong and responsive
private industry are needed not only for the changing technologies and
requirements for national security but also for approaches to national
problems such as (i) an unfavorable international balance of trade and
the consequent need for increased productivity and (ii) population growth
with the corollary problems of energy, pollution, housing, and transporta-
tion.
It is emphasized here that the Department of Defense should not
(and does not) address the nation's needs for a strong technical base by
providing extra or abnormal allowances for a company's technical efforts.
However, by Government recognizing IR&D as a normal and necessary part of
a company doing business, the national interests, as well as the general
vitality and usefulness of industry, are served.
18

a. Research and Development, Productivity, and International
Trade
Productivity refers to aicomparison between the quantity of
goods or services produced and the quantity of resources employed in pro-
ducing these goods and services. Attention has been directed by former
Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans [Stans, 1971 » PP« 8-9] to the United
States' present predicament with respect to productivity by taking an
historical look at the relative productivity growth rates of various coun-
tries. Table I reflects this comparison.
TABLE I.
AVERAGE ANNUAL PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATE
IN THREE PERIODS, 1870-1969
1870-1950 195P_-1965 1965-1969
United States 2.h% 2.6% 1.7%
Europe* 1.% ^.0% Ur.5%
Japan 1A% 6.&% 10.6%
* Italy, Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and U.K.
Source: Maurice Stans
From 1870 to 1950 the United States' rate of productivity growth exceeded
Europe's by 60 percent and Japan's by ?0 percent. Starting in 1950 the
situation was reversed and United States' productivity growth now lags
well behind Europe and Japan. From 1950 to 1965* the United States' pro-
ductivity growth rate trailed Europe's by 35 percent and Japan's by 60
percent. The trend since I965 shows an even more rapid relative decline.
United States* rate trailed Europe by 60 percent and Japan by 8^ percent.
These differentials in rates result from unprecedented levels of produc-




The President's Task Force on Science Policy has issued a
report which states [Commission on Government Procurement, Vol. 2, 1972,
P. 59]:
Economic growth will, over a long period of time, define the total level
of resources within which our national goals must be achieved. Because
of the central significance of economic growth to all other national goals,
it is especially important to point out its dependence on science and
technology.
If a major national goal is increasing the quality of life for
the mass of the population, it becomes essential that continued technol-
ogical development also be a high priority national goal. Technology
growth has a significant effect on continued economic growth and on con-
tinuing increases in the productivity of individual companies, whole in-
dustries, and the overall national economy.
The overall United States' balance of trade in recent years
deteriorated from surpluses of five to seven billion dollars in the early
1960's to levels of one to two billion dollars since 196?. In 1971 » the
trade surplus disappeared completely and was replaced by a deficit of
one-and-a-half billion dollars. This was the first trade deficit since
1893 [Stans, 1971, p. 6],
To analyze trade problems and identify relationships between
technology growth and United States trade balances, the overall balance
of trade can be broken into various categories: (i) agricultural pro-
ducts; (ii) raw material (minerals, oil, etc.); (iii) low-technology
manufactures (textiles, iron and steel, footwear); and (iv) high-technology
manufactures (computers, automotive products, aircraft and other trans-
portation equipment, chemicals, machinery, scientific and professional
instruments). Figures 2, 3> ^» and 5 show trends in the differential be-
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Procurement, Vol. 2, 19?2, p. 6l], The following points can be made
concerning the figures:
(1) Agricultural products have shown a fluctuating sur-
plus of between one and two billion dollars.
(2) Raw materials have had a large and persistent defi-
cit, increasing to $^.1 billion in 1971.
(3) The major trade losses have occurred in low-technology
products. They had a $1.8 billion average annual surplus from 1951 to
1955- This has changed to an ever-increasing deficit which reached $8.3
billion in 1971.
(k) The increasing deficits in raw materials and low-
technology products have been off-set in the past by sizeable and stable
surpluses in high-technology products. However, a surplus of $9.6 bil-
lion in 1970 was reduced substantially to $8.3 billion in 1971.
Dr. Frederick Scherer, economist at the University of Michi-
gan, has emphasized the importance of technology evolution to the nation
[^Commission on Government Procurement, 1972, p. 6Z~\:
The export strength of this country has always been in areas of high tech-
nology. Traditionally this country leads areas of new technology for a
while. The second stage normally sees U.S. firms establish subsidiaries
overseas to take advantage of lower labor costs. The third stage is imi-
tation by indigenous entrepreneurs. It is a regular cycle which must be
revitalized periodically by us taking the lead in new areas of technology
or this country may become the Britain of 1980. Since the Government is
the principal supporter of research, it has an obligation to plan sensibly
to retain our lead.
An additional factor can be seen from Table II [Stans, 1971
1
Chart 10], which indicates that the United States' cost of labor is greater
than all other countries by a substantial margin. If foreign competitors
can just approach the technology of the United States, they can be signi-




INDEXES OF COMPARATIVE LABOR COST IN MANUFACTURING
(includes fringe benefits)
I960 126jS 1970
United States 100 100 100
Japan 11 16 26
United Kingdom 32 36 37
France 30 37 39
West Germany 32 ^5 5^
Canada 82 72 83
Source: Maurice Stans
If the United States is to continue to enjoy the current level of compen-
sation benefits for its people, it must maintain its counterbalancing
productivity advantage, which means that it must maintain a substantially
superior technological position. In order to do this a fundamental fact
must be remembered: the main sources of increase in the productivity of
labor are, by far, actions by individuals in pursuit of their private in-
terests. They seek ways to increase the efficiency with which their labor
and capital are used in order to get more for themselves.
Concerned individuals may wonder if a greater appropriation
of funds for research and development actually results in greater tech-
nological growth and subsequent increased productivity. Because factors
other than R&D, such as investment and education, contribute to economic
growth and productivity, it is difficult to quantify the relationship.
However, -the relationship has been examined for groups of firms, whole
industries, and the nation. Positive and significant correlation has been
found between R&D effort financed either by industry or the Government
2k

and the rate of productivity growth. Some of the findings are described
"below:
a. Nestor E. Terleckyj, in a study of twenty industries,
found that the industries with a high ratio of research expenditures to
sales had not only higher rates of productivity gain, but higher rates of
growth and a higher proportion of their sales from new or substantially
changed- products not in existence four years earlier. He found that there
was a 0.7 percent increase in the rate of productivity increase associated
with each 1.0 percent increase in the growth rate of R&D expenditures.
He also found that the rate of growth of industry productivity increased
by 0,5 percent for each tenfold increase in the ratio of R&D expenditures
to sales [Terleckyj, i960, p. 64].
b. In a study of seventeen chemical firms for the period
1948-1957, a gross return of 54 percent on investment in R&D was discov-
ered [Minasian, I962].
c. Edwin Mansfield, during an examination of ten petro-
leum firms, found an average of 40 to 60 percent marginal rates of return
on R&D investment. He found between 7 and 30 percent for ten chemical
firms, the variation being due to differing assumptions used. In a study
of food, apparel, and furniture, he found that for each 1.0 percent in-
crease in the rate of growth of R&D expenditures, there was a 0.1 to 0.7
percent growth in productivity. Again, the variation depended on the
assumptions used. However, it was felt that the assumptions underlying
the larger values were closer to reality [Mansfield, 1968, p. 20],
d. A study of twenty-four manufacturing industries es-
timated that, on the average, productivity was raised 1.3 percent anually
for an industry that conducted R&D. The study further estimated that the
average annual productivity increased another 1.1 percent because of R&D
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conducted by industries supplying the inputs. Of the twenty-four
industries examined, the direct and indirect R&D effort accounted for
more than half the average productivity gain of 4.5 percent a year [Raines,
1968, Working Paper No. 6814],
e. A Russian economist found that United States' expend-
itures for R&D were several times more effective in increasing output
than the same amount spent on fixed capital. For the period 1951-1966,
an incremental dollar spent on R&D was associated with an increase of
$2.39 in output, assuming a five-year lag between R&D expenditures and
associated increases in output, and $4.36 if a ten-year lag was assumed.
Conversely, the increase in output associated with investment in fixed
capital was only $0.35 [Komzin, 1970, pp. 115-117].
f
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Productivity in selected industries for the period
I960 to 1971 is indicated in figure 6 [Zimmerman, Cost Engineering , April
1973 » PP. 18-19]. The figure shows productivity growth and indexes based
on output per total number of employees. It demonstrates that productiv-
ity increases in some industries were negligible and in others were re-
markably high. Interestingly, the industries with the greatest produc-
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There is a critical need to accept and to plan for continued,
substantial population growth. Robert S. McNamara, president of the
World Bank, stated [McNamara address to World Bank Board of Governors,
25 Sep 1972]:
While the population problem is clearly one which cannot be solved within
the confines of a five-year plan, or a development decade, or indeed even
during what is left of our century, it is by its very nature a problem
that can grow only worse with procrastination and delay. That is why we




The world's population currently is increasing at about 2
percent annually, doubling every thirty-five years. As is indicated by
figure 7 [United Nations, 1970], this growth rate is unprecedented. It
took two million years for man's numbers to reach one billion, one hun-
dred years for the second billion, and successive billions continue to
come even faster. At the present rate of increase, the sixth billion
will require less than a decade. Figure 8 [United Nations, 1970^]
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illustrates the geographical distribution of the population growth and
the fact that the United States and other developed countries represent
the minority of the population ratio, which is currently 30:70 between
developed and underdeveloped countries and is expected to swing unrelent-
ingly to 20:80 and perhaps to 10:90 by the year 2050 [Frejka, Scientific
American
,
Vol. 228, No. 3, March 1973].
Population is growing rapidly because man has succeeded, to
an unprecedented degree, in controlling disease and feeding the world's
people. More babies survive to become parents. But while the death rate
has been reduced, nations have been slow to reduce their high birth rates
so that population would remain stable. The consequence is that uncon-
trolled human fertility may pose a greater threat to man's future well-
being than any other single factor. Slowing population growth is a
prerequisite to solving many of mankind's most pressing problems.
Continuing population growth is steadily reducing the per
capita global supply of living space, fresh water, forest products, in-
dustrial raw materials, energy fuels and arable land. It is causing a
sharp increase in the number of new entrants into the job market and re-
sultant increasing unemployment in the underdeveloped countries; this
leads to declining living standards, poverty, and misery. Population
growth is causing a widening gap between the rich and poor nations with
respect to the distribution of the world's wealth; this is likely to in-
crease violence as the depressed people may resort to desperate means of
redressing the imbalance of power and wealth. It is causing an increased
social crisis, as the world's people are becoming more urban and less ru-
ral; this is resulting in the deprivation of the basic amenities of life




































The world's natural environment is steadily deteriorating as
a habitat for living things, including man. The atmosphere of airs and
climates, the hydrosphere of rivers, lakes, and oceans, the lithosphere
from which rock has crumbled away over the millennia to give us our thin
and fragile envelope of soil — all are being polluted at an ever-increasing
rate.
The world economy will not have enough air, water, space and
amenity left for its increasing number of people unless a more modest
attitude is adopted for purely material demands. It is imperative that
the developed countries invent forms of consumption and enjoyment that
make fewer claims on a limited biosphere. The biosphere is the only one
in existence and it will be required to support four billion additional
people by the year 2000. With the population ever increasing, resources
growing more expensive, technologies becoming more complicated, and human
aspirations rising in all societies, there is little time in which to
make the more responsible choices and better environmental judgments.
To maintain the same standard of living for its people a
country must double its output of goods and services (gross national pro-
duct) in the same tine that population doubles. To improve standards of
living it must more than double its gross national product.
In the cities and on the land, only a massive and increasing
investment of capital and skill can give governments and peoples time to
evolve the kind of modernized, technological, and high-productivity so-
ciety that is so essential. In order to accomplish this, a synergistic
effort on the part of individuals, institutions, industry and government,
is required. A company's independent research and development effort, as
well as the Government's specific research and development projects, can
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assist in reaching a better world order by alleviating some of the strain
caused by the population explosion.
Alone in space, alone in its life-supporting systems, powered by incon-
ceivable energies, mediating them to us through the most delicate adjust-
ments, wayward, unlikely, unpredictable, but nourishing, enlivening, and
enriching in the largest degree — is this not a precious home for all of
us earthlings? Is it not worth our love? Does it not deserve all the
inventiveness and courage and generosity of which we axe capable to pre-
serve it from degradation and destruction and, by doing so, to secure our




In i7?6, the new nation of the United States of America had natural
resources in abundance. Means for exploiting them were very limited.
National security objectives were very modest, namely, to avoid foreign
entanglements, to defend the land frontiers against the Indians and the
neighbors in Canada and Florida, and to maintain internal security. Of
these three, defense against the Indians appeared to many to be the most
important. For this purpose, a small military establishment was consid-
ered sufficient. To manage this small establishment, a War Department
was created. In the very first year the military establishment consist-
ed only of ground forces — an Army of ^+6 officers and 672 men [[Hitch,
i965» p. 5Ji Cost principles in support of these forces were not con-
sidered to merit a high priority.
In 1793 > due to depredations inflicted on American shipping by the
Barbary pirated as well as by French Republican privateers, President
George Washington appealed for a condition of complete defense, stating
[Hitch, 1965, p. 6]
1
If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; If we desire
to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.
To make this condition a reality, the Congress, in March 179^ » authorized
the building of six frigates to form the backbone of a new, seagoing
United States Navy. Six private yards, so selected as to spread the work
among the states as equitably as possible and with greatest political ad-
vantage, were leased. Due to complications, the six keels were finally
laid at the end of 1795* However, shortly thereafter, partly as a re-
sult of mismanagement, delays, and cost overruns, the program was cut
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back to three frigates |_Hitch, 1965 > P« 6J. This was one of the nation's
first cases that indicated a need for cost principles.
A. HISTORY OF COST PRINCIPLES
The provisions of Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution empower
the Congress to enact procurement laws. In 1795 » the Congress enacted
the Purveyor of Public Supplies Act [l Stat. kl$ (1795) J. which became
the basis for procuring and providing all supplies required for the United
States military.
The Civil Sundry Appropriations Act was enacted in 1861 [l2 Stat.
220 (1861)]. In order to elicit a fair price by means of competition in
the market place, it specified that all purchases and contracts for sup-
plies and services by a department of the Government, except for personal
services, would be made by advertising, provided that public exigency did
not require immediate delivery or performance. Subsequently, the courts,
the Attorney General and the Comptroller General ruled that, where the
existence of only one source made competition impracticable, advertising
was not required.
During the Civil War, in large part due to public exigency, there were
no statutes to regulate profiteering. Contractors reaped unconscionable
profits on military procurement and had little reason to hide these pro-
fits.
During World War I, the Government acted to limit defense profits.
It used cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts that made necessary a
determination of allowable costs as a part of their administration. Cost-
plus-a-percentage-of-cost limited the percentage of profit that could be
earned but did not curb the amount of profit. Contractors simply inflated
costs with a result of increased profits.
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Excess profit taxes were established during the war, hut they were
only partially effective. These taxes did not apply if a contractor could
show that his profits, no matter how high they might he, were not appre-
ciably higher than his average pre-war profits. Thus, how industry ac-
counted for costs became a significant factor.
Legislation enacted between World War I and World War II did not re-
flect an appreciation of the basic deficiencies inherent in the prior
years' experience. The Vinson-Trammell Act of 193*1- [1*8 Stat. 503 (193*0]
and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 [**9 Stat. 1985 (1936)] applied only
to contracts for naval vessels and aircraft and merely required payment
to the Treasury of profits earned in excess of a fixed percentage of the
contract price. Hence, contractors drove up costs and thus increased
their total profit. Further, a profit of ten percent of costs could re-
sult in exorbitant profits from a return-on-investment standpoint.
On 7 August 19^0 i the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the ap-
proval of the Secretaries of the Treasury, War and Navy Departments, prom-
ulgated Treasury Decision 5000 [Treasury Decision 5000, 19 ;*0] under Section
2(b) of the Act of 28 June 19^*0 [54 Stat. 6?6 (19**0)], as a guide for
recapturing excess profits on contracts for vessels and aircraft. It
included cost principles to determine allowability of costs for cost-
reimbursement type contracts. This marked the first time that indepen-
dent technical effort was recognized as an allowable cost. Independent
technical effort was largely devoted to product development rather than
to research, as is evidenced by the following Treasury Decision 5000 pro-
vision for cost- and fixed-price contracts:
Other manufacturing costs as used in paragraph (b) of this section in-
cludes ... 'deferred' or 'unliquidated' experimental and development
charges. For example, in case experimental and development costs have
been properly deferred or capitalized and are amortized in accordance
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with a reasonably consistent plan, a proper portion of the current charge,
determined by a ratable allocation which is reasonable in consideration
of the pertinent facts, may be treated as a cost of performing the con-
tract or subcontract. In the case of general experimental and development
expenses which may be charged off currently, a reasonable portion thereof
may be allocated to the cost of performing the contract or subcontract.
If a special experimental or development project is carried on in pur-
suance of a contract, or in anticipation of a contract which is later
entered into, and the expense is not treated as a part of general ex-
perimental and development expenses or is not otherwise allowed as a cost
of performing the contract, there clearly appearing no reasonable pros-
pect of an additional contract for the type of article involved, the en-
tire cost of such project may be allowed as a part of the cost of per-
forming the contract.
Bidding costs were also addressed [Treasury Decision 5000, 1940^]:
Bidding and general selling expenses which by reference to all the perti-
nent facts and circumstances reasonably constitute a part of the cost of
performing a contract or subcontract (are allowable). The treatment of
bidding and general selling expenses as a part of general expenses in ac-
cordance with this paragraph is in lieu of any direct charges which might
otherwise be made for such expenses. The term 'bidding expenses' as used
in this section includes all expenses in connection with preparing and
submitting bids.
The provisions of the law upon which Treasury Decision 5000 was based
(Vinson-Trammell Act) were suspended by the Second Revenue Act of 19^0
[5^ Stat. 97^- (19^0)] but many contracts entered into after that date in-
cluded Section 26.9 by reference or direct quotation for the specific pur-
pose of defining reimbursable costs. Treasury Decision 5000 has substan-
tial historical significance in that it is generally considered the fore-
runner and basis for all regulations relating to the determination of
costs under Department of Defense contracts.
Practical explanation and elaboration of Treasury Decision 5000 occur-
red in April 19^-2, when the War Department and Navy Department jointly
issued a thin pamphlet with a soft green cover entitled "Explanation of
Principles for Determination of Costs Under Government Contracts." This
pamphlet "went on to a long life of fame as the "Green Book," which became
the recognized basis and authority for cost determination, as it provided
the philosophy for allowable costs in Government contracts.
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The National Security Act of 19^7, as amended in 19^9 > established
the Department of Defense [63 Stat. 578 ( 19^-9)U- A companion piece of
legislation — the Armed Services Procurement Act of 19^7 \J>2. Stat. 21
(19^-7)1 — led to the issuance of the Armed Services Procurement Regula-
tion (ASPR) which implemented the act [ASPR, 19^9]. The ASPR included as
Section XV a set of cost principles, the use of which was mandatory in
all cost-type contracts entered into on and after 1 March 19^-9 • Section
XV replaced Treasury Decision 5000 ' s cost principles. It allowed inde-
pendent development "but did not allow independent research unless speci-
fically provided for in the contract. This restriction was often circum-
vented by adding a clause to contracts authorizing reimbursement of re-
search costs. In some cases, separate agreements for IR&D were negoti-
ted and applied across the board to all Government contracts received by
a given contractor. B&P expenses were generally accepted; the cost prin-
ciples recognized the allowability of selling and distribution expenses
incurred in connection with marketing the contractor's products.
The decade following publication of ASPR (19^9) Section XV was char-
acterized by considerable criticism of the cost principles therein and by
a number of significant attempts to correct the situation. The solutions
followed a general pattern — complete rewrite of a new Section XV prac-
tically on an annual basis.
Comprehensive cost principles were finally adopted in November 1959.
This complete revision, effective on 1 July i960
,
provided that the cost
.principles would be used as a guide for fixed-price type contracts. These
cost principles introduced the test of reasonableness and allocability in
passing on the allowability of contract costs. They defined "research"
and "development" and treated them separately. Independent research costs
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were generally allowable if allocated to all the contractor's business,
and development costs were allowable if directly related to those product
lines for which the Government had contracts. The 1959 ASPR considered
advance agreements between the contractor and the Government to be impor-
tant in determining the amount of such costs that the Government would
recognize. Guidelines for technical evaluation of these costs were stated
in a DOD instruction entitled "Uniform Negotiation for Reimbursement of
Independent Research and Development Costs" [DOD Inst. Jj-105.52, 28 June
I960].
During the 1960's many problems arose regarding the 1959 cost princi-
ples. There was concern over the separation of "research" and "develop-
ment," differentiation between IR&D and B&P, technical evaluation asso-
ciated with advance agreement negotiations, and also the application of
overhead to IR&D and B&P.
In the early 1960's a DOD Task Group, under the leadership of the
Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering (ODDR&E) , was or-
ganized to address the problems resulting from the 1959 cost principles
[jLMI Report on CITE Reimbursement policies, Aug 1966]. The major rec-
ommendation of this Task Group was to identify IR&D, B&P and something
called "Other Technical Effort (OTE)" — considered to consist of indi-
rect technical efforts which were essentially in the nature of IR&D and
B&P but not identified as such in the accounting records — collectively
as "Contractor Independent Technical Effort (CITE)." It was intended to
lump all of these costs into one pool and to have a proposed procedure
to achieve a negotiated ceiling. The planned first step was to modify
the cost principles in order to combine IR&D and B&P into CITE, to im-
prove the definitions, and to establish a policy of applying overhead to
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CITE. This effort was to be followed by a determination of reasonableness,
which would have considered "Contractor Weighted Average Share in Cost Rick
(CWAS)" and the development of industry norms. The Task Group effort con-
tinued until late I966 when the Secretary of Defense terminated it on the
basis that IR&D and B&P were generated for different purposes and should
be treated separately.
The Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and
Logistics (OASDI&L) then assumed responsibility and initiated plans to
revise the cost principles. This effort culminated in revisions to ASPR
in 1969» which revisions placed tighter controls over the separation of
IR&D and B&P, utilized the CWAS concept, and provided a formula technique
for contracts not using that concept.
The fiscal year 1970 defense procurement funds were subjected to a
most careful legislative examination by the Congress. Senator William
Proxmire of Wisconsin conducted a direct assault on IR&D. In the course
of consideration of the Defense Procurement Authorization Act for 1970,
the Senator proclaimed alarm at the escalation of these costs [See Table
III later in this chapter] and suggested sharp restrictions on the avail-
ability of appropriated funds to reimburse contractors for allocable shares
of IR&D, B&P, and OTS expense. The result was the adoption by the Senate
on 16 September 1969 °f an amendment to the authorization bill which
would have placed a dollar limit on such expenditures in the amount of
$^68 million, a sum considered to represent a reduction of approximately
twenty percent in the prior year's spending figure for that purpose.
CWAS is a procedure for recognizing contractors who bear large shares
of the risks involved in their costs and exempting them from certain au-
dits. If a contractor can achieve a CWAS rating, certain of the selected
items of cost which he incurs will be presumed to be reasonable because




On 8 October I969, Senator Proxmire introduced S.3003. embodying his
original proposal in this area and banning any payment for IR&D unless
such work was determined by the contracting agency to be of direct or in-
direct benefit to the work being performed under the contract.
Subsequently, the House-Senate Conference on the authorization bill
arrived at a compromise agreement, which was enacted as Section 403 of
the Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-121) and stat-
ed [83 Stat. 204 (1969)]:
Funds authorized for appropriation under provisions of this Act shall not
be available for payment of independent research and development, bid and
proposal, and other technical effort costs incurred under contracts en-
tered into subsequent to the effective date of this Act for any amount in
excess of 93 Per centum of the total amount contemplated for use for such
purposes out of funds authorized for procurement and for research, devel-
opment, test, and evaluation. The foregoing limitation shall not apply
in the case of (l) formally advertised contracts, (2) other firmly fixed
contracts competitively awarded, or (3) contracts under $100,000.
Extensive hearings on IR&D and B&P were held during the first half of
1970 by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in relation to the
fiscal year 1971 Military Procurement Authorization Bill. Section 203 of
the 1971 Act [84 Stat. 904 (1970)] repealed the 93 percent limitation of
the 1970 Act but added further restrictions on the allowability of IR&D
and B&P costs. It required that: (i) funds authorized for appropriation
to DOD not be available for payment of IR&D and B&P unless the Secretary
of Defense determined that the work for which payment was to be made had
a potential relationship to a military function or operation; (ii) DOD
negotiate advance agreements to establish dollar ceilings on such costs
with all companies which, during the last preceding year, received more
than two million dollars of IR&D or B&P payments from DOD; and (iii) IR&D
portions of the negotiated advance agreements be based on company- submitted
plans that are technically evaluated by DOD prior to or during the fiscal
year covered by the agreement.
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Based on this action and the continuing study by DOD, further revisions
to the ASPR cost principles were prepared and issued as Defense Procurement
Circular (DPC) 90 on 1 September 1971 and went into effect on 1 January
1972 [DPC 90, 1 Sep 1971].
DPC 90 requires that IR&D and B&P costs include all direct and allo-
cable indirect costs except that general and administrative costs are not
considered allocable to IR&D and B&P. IR&D and B&P costs are to be allo-
cated to contracts on the same basis as the general and administrative
(G&A) expense grouping of the profit center in which such costs are in-
curred. A separate dollar ceiling is required for IR&D and for B&P. How-
ever, a contractor can recover costs for IR&D above the negotiated ceil-
ing, provided that recovery of B&P costs covered by the same agreement is
decreased below its ceiling by a like amount, and vice versa. Within
ceiling limitations, contractors are not required to share IR&D costs.
In negotiating a ceiling, particular attention is to be paid to the tech-
nical evaluation and the potential military relationship of the IR&D pro-
jects, comparison with previous years' programs, and changes in the com-
pany's business activities. Allowable IR&D and B&P costs for companies
not required to negotiate advance agreements are established by an his-
torically-based formula.
A new DOD instruction [DOD Inst. 5100.66, 29 Feb. 1972] has superseded
DOD Instruction 4105.52. It prescribes the role, mission, and composition
of the IR&D Policy Council and assigns responsibilities and outlines pro-
cedures for the technical evaluation and review of IR&D programs by the
IR&D Technical Evaluation Group.
The IR&D Policy Council is responsible for developing policy and guid-
ance for IR&D and B&P matters. It determines the proper level of DOD sup-
port required, outlines IR&D and B&P goals, establishes the mechanisms to
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be used to regulate the overall level of effort, provides the necessary
guidance to insure valid potential relevancy determinations, determines
appropriate negotiation policies, and responds to congressional inquiries.
The IR&D Technical Evaluation Group (formerly the Armed Services Re-
search Specialists Committee) is composed of a chairman appointed by the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering and three IR&D departmental
managers — one each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. It is respon-
sible for establishing criteria and methodology to be used by the military
departments for the technical evaluations and ratings of IR&D programs.
These evaluations determine the relevance and quality of each project and
categorize each project as research or development in accordance with the
ASPR definition.
Difficulties continue to be experienced with cost principles for IR&D
and B&P, Problems persist in developing and negotiating IR&D and B&P ad-
vance agreements. Most agreements are not negotiated before costs are
incurred. Negotiation procedures are neither uniform nor consistent.
After-the-fact reviews to determine relevancy, especially for B&P efforts,
are excessively delayed. Contractors are concerned about what they be-
lieve to be a repressive effect of the requirement for a potential mili-
tary relationship upon highly innovative research and development.
B. HISTORY OF COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
Following hearings by the House Banking and Currency Committee in I968
on a relatively routine bill to extend the Defense Production Act of 1950,
a biennial responsibility, the House Committee reported the bill with an
unusual amendment. This amendment had its origins in testimony by two
witnesses before that committee: Mr. Price Daniel, Director, Office of
Emergency Planning, and Vice Admiral H.G. Rickover.
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The Admiral's testimony was critical of the manner in which Government
procurement was being accomplished, as well as of groups involved, which
groups included elements in the DOD, industry, and the accounting profes-
sion. His testimony addressed accounting practices with specific state-
ments [Staats, 1969» p. 21]
I
1. that "lack of uniform accounting standards is the most serious
deficiency in Government procurement today;"
2. that "industry vail not establish such standards because it
is not to their advantage to do so;"
3. that the accounting profession "has had ample time and oppor-
tunity to establish effective standards" but pays "only lip service to
the concept;" and
k. that "if uniform accounting standards are ever to be estab-
lished the initiative will have to come from Congress."
The Admiral indicated that the issue of uniform cost accounting stan-
dards was neither new nor revolutionary in that the concept had existed
in Continental Europe for years. He found that in the early 1920' s, a
German professor, Eugene Schmalenbach, was frustrated by his inability
to make accurate comparisons of the financial data made available by dif-
ferent companies. The professor's Model Chart of Accounts had laid the
foundation for the subsequent development of uniform accounting in Ger-
many and in other European countries.
Admiral Rickover recommended an amendment to the Defense Production
Act which would require contractors to account for costs under Govern-
ment contracts in accordance with uniform accounting standards. He also
recommended that the legislation require that defense contractors pro-
vide a report of costs and profits for each contract over $100,000.
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When the Senate Banking and Currency Committee conducted its hearings
in June 1968, various witnesses testified from Government, industry, and
the accounting profession; and the Committee received many statements and
letters. While a few favored the legislation, at least in part, the over-
whelming majority of views expressed by witnesses opposed the legislation.
Following the hearings, the Senate Committee reported the House "bill
but deleted all language having anything to do with "uniform accounting
standards." However, when the bill was debated on the Senate floor, Sen-
atore Proxmire offered a modified amendment designed to accommodate some
of the objections raised and recommendations offered during the testi-
mony. Senator Proxmire' s amendment was adopted by the Senate, agreed to
by the House, and became law on 1 July 1968, as part of Public Law 90-
370 [82 Stat. 279 (1968)].
The Proxmire amendment provided that the Comptroller General, in co-
operation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget, should undertake a study to determine the feasibility of ap-
plying uniform cost accounting standards to be used in all negotiated
price contract and subcontract defense procurements of $100,000 or more.
After studying the subject, the General Accounting Office (GA0) de-
termined that uniform cost accounting standards were both feasible and
necessary to provide a greater degree of uniformity and consistency in
cost accounting. Mr. Elmer B. Staats, the Comptroller General, in testi-
mony before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, states that he be-
lieved uniform cost accounting standards would result in a substantial
savings of public funds. (Admiral Rickover's estimate of savings was two
billion dollars a year.) [Rickover, 1970]
The GAO feasibility study found that ASPR Section XV relied heavily
on the conventional practices of contractors [GAO Report of Feasibility
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of Cost Accounting Standards , Jan 1970]. In ascertaining what constituted
costs f Section XV provided that any generally accepted method of deter-
mining or estimating costs could be used that was equitable under the cir-
cumstances. Elsewhere, it placed a dependence upon "generally accepted
accounting principles." In some areas, Section XV also accepted the ac-
counting methods allowed by the Internal Revenue Service for income tax
purposes.
The study found that generally accepted accounting principles, regu-
lations of the Internal Revenue Service, regulations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and rules adopted by the Renegotiation Board were not
adequate for contract costing because they had been designed for different
purposes.
The GAO report emphasized that, while the provisions of Section XV of
ASPR were intended to provide general cost accounting guidance and pro-
cedures for defense contracting, their effectiveness was impaired because:
(i) they made frequent references to non-applicable principles and regu-
lations, (ii) they lacked specific criteria for the use of alternative
accounting principles and indirect cost allocation methods, and (iii) they
were of limited applicability, since they were mandatory for only cost-
reimbursement-type contracts.
The report stated that cost accounting standards should apply to ne-
gotiated procurement contracts and subcontracts, both cost- and fixed-
price, and should be made applicable government-wide. In addition, new
machinery should be established for the development of cost accounting
standards and these standards should strive to eliminate unnecessary al-
ternative cost accounting practices.
The Comptroller General's report stimulated vigorous debates in both
Houses of Congress. This resulted in Public Law 91-379* which was enacted
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on 15 August 1970 [84 Stat. 796 (1970)]. This new law added Section 719
to the Defense Production Act and thereby created the Cost Accounting
Standards Board as an agent of the Congress and independent of the execu-
tive departments of Government. Among other things, the law provided for
the following:
1. A Cost Accounting Standards Board was created. It consists
of the Comptroller General as chairman, and four members appointed by
him — one representative from industry, one from Government, and two
from the accounting profession.
2. The Board is authorized to promulgate cost accounting stan-
dards. These standards are intended to achieve uniformity and consist-
ency in the cost accounting principles followed by defense contractors
and subcontractors under contracts in excess of $100,000, other than con-
tracts where the price negotiated is based on (i) established catalog or
market prices of commercial items sold in substantial, quantities to the
general public or (ii) prices set by law or regulation. In promulgating
such standards, the Board is to consider the probable costs of implemen-
tation compared to the probable benefits.
3. The Board is authorized to make regulations which require de-
fense contractors and subcontractors, as a condition of contracting, to
disclose in writing their cost accounting principles, including methods
of distinguishing direct cost from indirect cost and the basis used for
allocating indirect costs. Contractors are required to agree to a con-
tract price adjustment, with interest, for any excess costs paid to the
contractors by the United States because of the contractors' failure to
comply with duly promulgated cost accounting standards in pricing contract




The first substantive issuances by the Cost Accounting Standards
Board "became effective 1 July 1972. These include [^Cost Accounting Stan-
dards Board Progress Report to the Congress, Aug 1972]]:
1. A requirement that contractors use a Disclosure Statement to
reveal in writing their cost accounting practices and then follow those
practices consistently.
2. A Standard on "Consistency in Estimating, Accumulating, and
Reporting Costs" designed to insure that each contractor's practices used
in estimating costs for a proposal are consistent with cost accounting
practices used by it in accumulating and reporting actual costs.
3. A Standard on "Consistency in Allocating Costs Incurred for
the Same Purpose" designed to require that all costs incurred for the same
purpose and in like circumstances be either direct costs only or indirect
costs only.
4. A contract clause implementing the rules, regulations, and
Standards promulgated by the Board.
5# A regulation defining various terms used in Cost Accounting
Standards promulgated by the Board.
The Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Admini-
stration, and the Atomic Energy Commission have issued regulations through
joint action which are parallel in structure and content to the issuances
of the Cost Accounting Standards Board and, hence, implement the standards
in the respective agencies. The General Services Administration has pro-
vided that the Cost Accounting Standards Board's Standards, rules, and
regulations are to be extended to non-defense as well as defense contracts
of the civilian executive agencies. All of these regulations became ef-
fective 1 July 1972.
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A standard on "Allocation of Home Office Expenses to Segments" was
issued on lh December 1972. This standard governs how a contractor may
allocate expenses of its corporate headquarters to various divisions,
subsidiaries or plants. The standard prescribes criteria for allocation
based primarily on the beneficial or causal relationship between such
expenses and the receiving segments [Federal Register, Ik Dec 1972],
A standard on "Capitalization of Tangible Assets" was issued on 27
February 1973 • It applies to expenditures for acquisition of tangible
capital assets during the contractor's next fiscal year beginning on or
after 1 October 1973. It establishes rules for fixed asset accounting
in order to determine the acquisition costs to be capitalized as opposed
to those which are charged against revenues of the current accounting
period. A capitalization policy in accordance with this standard is in-
tended to facilitate measurement of costs consistently over time [Federal
Register, 27 Feb 1973].
A standard on "Accounting for Unallowable Costs" was issued on 6 Sep-
tember 1973* It was established to provide guidelines to cover identifi-
cation by contractors of specific costs which are unallowable at the time
such costs first become defined or are authoritatively designated as un-
allowable and to cover the cost accounting treatment to be accorded such
costs [Federal Register, 6 Sep 1973].
The Cost Accounting Standards Board has selected further subjects for
research work in connection with possible development of Cost Accounting




3. Vacation, sick pay, and holiday pay
48

k. Cost accounting period





10. Retirement plan costs
11. Allocation of burden
12. Cost of capital
13. Deferred incentive compensation
Ik, Other labor-related costs
15. Direct and indirect costs
16. Independent research & development and bidding & proposal
costs
17. Current value or price-level accounting
18. Terminology for cost accounting
C. STATISTICAL HISTORY OF FUNDS FOR INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
An indication of the emphasis placed on research and development as
a foundation of the nation's technological effort appears in the ratio of
R&D expenditures to the gross national product (GNP) , a measure of the
total output of goods and services in the United States. In 1964, total
R&D spending in the economy reached a peak of 3*0 percent of the GNP.
R&D expenditures have declined in relation to GNP since that time, reach-
ing 2.7 percent in 1970. Figure 9 depicts the trend [NSF Report 72-309,
1972].
During the early 1950' s, growth in total Federal R&D was slow but
steady. By 195? the growth rate accelerated, reaching a peak of over 12
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FIGURE 9
Source: National Science Foundation, 1972
of greater than $17 billion in fiscal 1967. as indicated in Figure 10,
which was developed from various National Science Foundation reports [Com-
mission on Government Procurement Report, Vol. 2, 1972, p. 12]. The total
R&D obligations declined after I967 to $15.5 billion in fiscal 1971. This
represents about 7 percent of the Federal budget. R&D obligations were
expected to total $15.2 billion in fiscal 1972 and $17.8 billion in fis-




In 1972 Federal agencies were expected to provide ljh percent of all
national R&D funds, with support supplied by industry estimated at HO
percent. The largest Federal, support share was recorded in 196^ at more
than 65 percent of the national total, as indicated in figure 11 [_NSF
Report 72-317, 1972, p. 3].
TRENDS tn FEDERAL R&D OBLIGATIONS*
Trends T N NATIONA] "
FUNDING BY MAJOR SOURCE
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Figure 12 [NSF Report 72-317, 1972, p. 6] indicates the trends in R&D
obligations of Federal agencies leading in R&D programs. In 1973 the
share of DOD in the Federal R&D total was expected to be 50 percent, com-
pared with 58 percent in I963. The National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration's (NASA) share was an anticipated 19 percent in 1973 1 com-
pared with y\ percent in 19&5» the highest NASA share. The Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was expected to carry out 11 per-
cent of the total in 1973, more than twice its 5 percent share of I963.
TRENDS IN R&D OBLIGATIONS OF FEDERAL




Source: National Science Foundation
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The Atomic Energy Commission (ABC) will account for an estimated 8 percent
of the Federal R&D effort in 1973. compared with 9 percent in 1963. The
31 other agencies reporting R&D programs in the current (1971-73) period
show a significant rise in aggregate R&D support. This group has moved
from a 5 percent share in I963 to an expected Ik percent in 1973. The
greatest dollar increases in this group in the period 1971-73 are record-
ed by the National Science Foundation.
Trends in Federal R&D obligations by major performer (Figure 13 [NSF
Report 72-317 1 1972, p. 8]) shows that, during the 1963-73 period, in-
dustrial performance as a share of the Federal R&D total will have de-
creased from 66 percent to 52 percent, while Federal intramural perfor-
mance will have increased from 18 percent to 26 percent and universities
and colleges' share of R&D will have increased from 7 percent to 12 per-
cent.
The chief funding of industrial R&D performance has for many years
been provided by DOD and NASA, and the decline in NASA's overall activi-'
ties is the principal cause of diminished support to industry in recent
years, just as DOD programs now influence rising industry support. In
1973 1 the DOD share of R&D support to industrial firms, including Fed-
erally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC's), is estimated
at 62 percent of the Federal total, whereas the share of support repre-
sented by NASA, AEC, and the Department of Transportation is lower than
in former years.
National Science Foundation statistics indicate that, in 1970, the
industrial sector of the economy accounted for 68 percent of the nation's
R&D effort. Government and institutional laboratories accounted for the
remainder [NSF Report 72-309, 1972, p. 2]. Approximately kk- percent of
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Source: National Science Foundation
the work that companies performed in their facilities was paid for by
Government agencies. Further, two-thirds of Federal R&D funds in indus-
try ($5.2 billion) was provided by the Department of Defense in 1970.
The two leading industries receiving this support were, as indicated in
figure Ik, the aircraft and missile industry with $2.7 billion and the
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Source: National Chart of Accounts
electrical and communication industry with $1.5 billion. These two
industries accounted for 82 percent of the Defense Department funds
[NSF Report 72-309, 1972, p. 8],
Table III is provided to indicate the size and the relationship of
IR&D, B&P, and OTE costs. It shows the annual amount of each cost ele-
ment since 19&3, i-n three aspects: (i) total cost incurred by the con-
tractors, (ii) DOD decision of what the contractors should spend and could
recover in overhead, that is, the amount accepted, and (iii) the amount
of expense which could be recovered in DOD contracts (DOD share).
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Although there has been a steady increase over the years for each cost
element, the emphasis given by the contractors to each element has been
changing. Using DOD figures for total cost incurred, B&P costs as a per-
centage of IR&D costs have been declining — from 60 percent in 19&3 to
51 percent in I968. Other Technical Effort (OTE) has experienced a sim-
ilar decline. The relative increase in IR&D over B&P and OTE has gen-
erally been attributed to the increasing technological demands of the
marketplace. It should be noted that information will no longer be col-
lected under the heading of "OTE" because these costs have been reclassi-
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III. ALLOCABILITY OF IR&D MP B&P COSTS
Because the Government procures a significant number of items for
which it is impractical to secure effective price competition, proce-
dures are needed to insure that prices charged are fair and reasonable.
Hence, the extent to which IR&D and B&P costs are included in the total
price of the items bought is of much interest to Government.
Contractors generally feel that IR&D is merely a normal cost of doing
business and should not be singled out for special consideration. How-
ever , Government representatives generally feel that, where there is a
lack of normal competitive constraints, IR&D should be subject to cost
control in order to preclude excessive charges to the Government.
In order to determine whether or not excessive charges are being pre-
sented by the contractor, the total cost must be examined in terms of the
elements which make it up. The total cost of a contract is considered
to be the sura of the allowable direct and indirect costs allocable to the
contract, incurred or to be incurred, less any allocable credits [ASPR
Section 15-201.1, 1973.] • Additionally, ASPR provides that any generally
accepted method of determining or estimating costs that is equitable un-
der the circumstances may be usea when ascertaining what constitutes
costs.
To make the above statements more meaningful, the terms and ideas
will be discussed and amplifying information will be presented. Further,




A. FAIR AND REASONABLE PRICE
In a competitive economy, prices are the devices for the allocation
of resources. Price is determined by the forces of the marketplace. When
an item is in increasing demand, the price for that item tends to increase;
when the supply is greater than the demand, the price usually drops. When
prices are high, resources are attracted to the successful industry and
production is increased. When the demand is satisfied and the supply he-
comes excessive, buying falls off, piices decline and then supply declines
in response. Hence, resources which formerly were used by the industry
are syphoned off into other, more active, markets.
1. Prices
The Government recognizes that prices are directly related to
profit and that profit is the prime motivator of private enterprise. The
objective of an entrepreneur is to sell at a price that will cover ex-
penses and, at the same time, provide a margin that will net a reasonable
profit. On the other hand, the Government's objective is to buy at the
lowest ultimate overall contract price. In achieving this objective, the
Government desires to pay a "fair and reasonable price" [ASPR Section
3-801.1, 1973].
The phrase "fair and reasonable" describes a conclusion as to
price. It implies that the price is acceptable to both the Government
and the seller. However, the validity of the decision that a price is
fair and reasonable depends upon the factors considered and the evaluation
of those factors in reaching that conclusion.
In Government competitive procurements by formal advertising —
where the award is made to the low responsible bidder whose bid conforms
to the invitation and is the most advantageous to the United States in
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terms of price and other factors — the price is normally presumed to be
fair and reasonable.
In Government procurement by negotiation, the lowest offer is not
necessarily fair and reasonable. Other factors that are considered in-
clude the quality in relation to use, the ability to deliver on time, and
the ultimate cost to the taxpayer. The ultimate cost may be measured by
such things as ease and cost of maintenance, transportation costs and
service life in addition to the cost of acquisition. Demonstration that
a given price is fair and reasonable depends on how the buyer reaches the
decision to buy at that price, how price comparisons are made, how Gov-
ernment engineering estimates and detailed estimates of the cost to per-
form are made, and how negotiations are prepared for and conducted.
The cost-plus system of pricing applies to situations wherein the
contractor prices the product at cost plus an additional amount for pro-
fit. This method is widely used in the defense industry where price com-
petition is lacking or the product is very distinctive.
Non-competitive contracts occupy a large percentage of total Gov-
ernment procurement. To illustrate this fact, in fiscal year 1972 the
Navy spent $12.2 billion in total direct purchases; of this total
,
$8.8
billion (?2 percent) was for non-competitive purchases [NAVMAT P-^-200,
June 1972, p. 2], Much of the $8.8 billion was used to contract with
major defense contractors for high dollar value programs. In order to
insure that the Government pays a fair and reasonable price, the Govern-
ment must concern itself with all costs in the non-competitive environ-
ment.
2. Costs
Costs are associated with resources — material , services, facil-
ities, equipment, personnel, and information — required to produce the
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product. The consumption of these necessary resources is measured in
terms of money.
There is no simple or single definition of cost which serves ail
situations and uses. Cost means different things under different circum-
stances. A cost may be considered to be a measurable expenditure to ac-
quire a product or service. Further, a cost may result from an expendi-
ture of cash or incurrence of a liability. In contracting, the Government
is concerned with its total cost of acquiring goods or services. On the
other hand, the contractor is concerned with his total revenue from the
contract and his incremental or marginal cost — the additionr1 .! cost that
will be incurred if that contract is undertaken.
Costs are always the costs of something. The item to which the
cost is related is called a "cost objective." A cost objective is de-
fined as [ASPR Section 15-109, 1973]
«
a function, organizational subdivision, contract, or other work unit for
which cost data are desired and for which provision is made to accumulate
and measure the cost of processes, products, jobs, capitalized projects,'
et cetera.
Specifying the cost objective is a decisive factor in the collec-
tion and assignment of costs because it sets the focus of interest in
cost determination. Establishing the cost of something implies that there
is some way to determine, what costs are pertinent to that cost objective.
In order to determine that a given cost is assignable to a partic-
ular cost objective, a criterion is needed. The conventional approach is
to use the concepts of direct and indirect costs, which have the effect
of dividing the issue of cost assignment into two parts. Direct cost and
indirect cost are defined in ASPR [ASPR Section 15-109, 1973].
Direct Cost - Any cost which is identified specifically with a particular
final cost objective. Direct costs are not limited to items which are
incorporated in the end product as material or labor. Costs identified
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specifically with a contract are direct costs of that contract. All costs
identified specifically with other final cost objectives of the contractor
are direct costs of those cost objectives.
Indirect Cost - Any cost not directly identified with a single final cost
objective, but identified with two or more final cost objectives or with
at least one intermediate cost objective.
Hence, a direct cost is any cost which can be identified specifically with
only one cost objective such as a product, a contract, or an organiza-
tional unit. Materials and labor that are used in the manufacture of a
product or in the performance of a contract are direct costs to the pro-
duct or the contract and are charged to each of these cost objectives.
An indirect cost is one which is incurred for, or which benefits,
common or joint objectives. After direct costs have been determined and
charged directly to the contract or other work, as appropriate, indirect
costs are those remaining to be allocated to the several classes of work.
There is no direct relation between expenditure and cost objective when
considering indirect costs. Nevertheless, indirect cost assignments i-
deally are based on some demonstrable relationships between the cost in-
currence and the factor used to complete the cost assignment.
These indirect costs are the costs simply of being in business
and are incurred in running the production plant, in the general admin-
istration of the company, and in other activities such as selling, en-
gineering, tooling, and research and development. Most firms collect
indirect costs in various logical cost groupings, with due consideration
of the reasons for incurring the costs. Each grouping, or indirect cost
pool, is determined so as to permit distribution on the basis of the bene-
fits accruing to the several cost objectives. Thus, a manufacturing firm
may keep separate accounts for manufacturing overhead, engineering over-
head, research and development overhead, and general and administrative
expenses. Each overhead pool would then be distributed to appropriate
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products or contracts. To do this fairly requires the selection of a
distribution base common to all cost objectives to which the grouping is
to be assigned. This may be accomplished on the basis of the direct costs
associated with the particular overhead pool. For example, manufacturing
overhead may be allocated on the basis of direct manufacturing labor,
engineering overhead on the basis of direct engineering labor, et cetera.
Whatever the basis, a contractor should be sure that it is in accordance
with applicable cost accounting standards or generally accepted accounting
principles.
A breakdown of direct and indirect costs which compose product










DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS
DIRECT MATERIALS DIRECT LABOR - PRIME COSTS
INDIRECT HATLRIALS COSTS ASSOCIATED OTHER IN- MANUFACTURING
AMI SUPPLIES INDIRECT LARPR
Supervision
KITH LABOR DIRECT COSTS
Rent
OVERHEAD (Eurdert)
Paint, Nails, 5 bolts Social Security Taxes
(Physically cnfiudied (Supt. $ Fore.) Unenployment Taxes Property Taxes
in product but are Factory Clerks Vacation Pay Insurance
minor in amount) Inspection Group Insurance Depreciation
Shop Supplies Maintenance Heat, Light, MANUFACTURING
Lubricants & Power COST (Factory)
Small Tools
GENERAL AND OPERATING






Samples Legal TOTAL COST
Entertainment Depreciation
Travel Expenses Telephone 6 Telegtaph
Rent Stationary (, Printing
Telephone 5 Telegraph Postage PROFIT
Stationary 6 Printing (Sane ccc^anies include *
Postage selling expenses in
Freight - out G£iA expenses) SELLING PRICE
Doubtful Accounts
Depreciation
DIRECT ENGINEERING, DIRECT R£D, DIRECT TOOLING
INDIRECT ENGINEERING, LNDIRECT RiD, INDIRECT TOOLLNG
_
FIGURE 15
Source: Ohio State University
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To allocate, or distribute over a base, is defined in ASPR [ASPR
Section 15-109, 1973].
Allocate - To assign an item of cost, or a group of items of cost, to one
or more cost objectives. This term includes both direct assignment of
cost and the reassignment of a share from an indirect cost pool.
A cost is considered allocable if it is assignable or chargeable to one
or more cost objectives in accordance with the relative benefits received
or other equitable relationship. Subject to this, a cost is allocable to
a Government contract if it [ASPR Section 15-201.4, 1973]
(a) is incurred specifically for the contract;
(b) benefits both the contract or other work, or both Government work
and other work, and can be distributed to them in reasonable proportion
to the benefits received; or
(c) is necessary to the overall operation of the business, although
a direct relationship to any particular cost objective cannot be shown.
The costs flow through a hierarchy of cost pools in order to en-
able their proper assignment. Activities are interrelated in most organi-
zations; various departments or units produce services that are used by
others. Each of these intermediate service centers is represented in the
pattern of cost analysis as a collection of costs (cost pool) traceable
to that center and assignable to the users of its service. A cost pool
may also exist for each product cost center wherein the final product is
manufactured. Costs which clearly arise from, and are assignable to, any
one of these product centers are added to intermediate service center
costs. This aggregate is then used as a higher level cost pool from which
costs are assigned to the processes or products.
Cost pools tend to average the costs assigned to them, and, there-
fore, the included elements need to be homogeneous. That is to say, the
cost pool constituents should be similar in the sense that they are ame-
nable to adding together without distorting the significance of the results
6k

when spread among the cost objectives by a common allocation base. The
common base is one that permits equitable distribution of the cost pool
with respect to the benefits received by the appropriate cost objectives.
This base should be closely related both to the pooled costs and to the
cost objective.
The only way to ascertain that the costs and services are homo-
geneous is to examine the data in detail — from the cost side and also
from the standpoint of the nature of the services that flow from given
cost centers. This necessitates a compromise between accuracy and ex-
pediency; greater accuracy requires more time and effort, which result
in higher cost.
B. IR&D AND MP COSTS
IR&D and MP costs are just two of the many types of costs considered
in Government negotiated contracts. A portion of the costs of a contrac-
tor's IR&D and MP efforts is generally supported by Government agencies
through the allowance of such costs as an independent charge to contracts.
Before being allocated to the various contracts — the cost objectives —
these costs are accumulated in their respective cost pools. Great diver-
sity of opinion exists regarding these cost pools and their allocation.
The controversy is centered around the following issues:
a. What is the most practical method of classifying and
accumulating IR&D and MP costs into the cost pools? The associated prob-
lems relate to the definitions of these costs and the composition of the
cost pools.
b. What are the most reasonable methods of allocation of
IR&D and MP costs? This concerns attempting to assign the costs to the




c. What should the basis for allocation of the costs be?
This area concerns the determination of vrhat key should be used to dis-
tribute these costs equitably.
These issues are addressed in the remaining pages of this chapter. Ad-
ditionally, the area of deferral or immediate recognition of IR&D and B&P
costs will be covered because of its importance to the subject of when
R&D costs should be paid. Finally, cost accounting standards, as related
to IR&D and B&P costs, will be considered,
i. Definitions for Research and Development
Research and development is defined in various ways. Most defi-
nitions make a distinction between basic research, applied research, and
development. An accounting definition, as contrasted with a technical
definition, is intended to provide a uniform basis for classifying ex-
penditures as research and development. Hence, an accounting definition
for research and development needs to be a practical, precise definition.
Furthermore, it is desirable that all contractors use the same general
principles for determining the amounts to be reported as R&D costs so
that the Government as well as stockholders can compare a particular com-
pany with another on the same basis.
The best known definition of R&D is probably that used by the
National Science Foundation. It is very similar to that used by the De-
partment of Defense, However, numerous other definitions exist because
many companies define R&D in individual ways for internal purposes. The
National Science Foundation defines R&D by identifying the types of acti-
vities that are included and the other types of activities that are ex-
cluded. Individual companies are requested to make reports to the National
Science Foundation based upon this stated definition.
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That definition is as follows [NSF Report 72-309, 1.972, p. 23]:
Research and development - Basic and applied research in the sciences and
engineering and the design and development of prototypes ajid processes.
This definition excludes quality control, routine product testing, market
research, sales promotion, sales service, research in the social sciences
or psychology, and other nontechnological activities or technical ser-
vices.
Basic research - Original investigations for the advancement of scienti-
fic knowledge not having specific commercial objectives, although such
investigations may be in fields of present or potential interest to the
reporting company.
Applied research - Investigations directed to the discovery of new sci-
entific knowledge having specific commercial objectives with respect to
products or processes. This definition differs from that of basic research
chiefly in terms of the objectives of the reporting company.
Development - Technical activities of a nonroutine nature concerned with
translating research findings or other scientific knowledge into products
or processes. Does not include routine technical services to customers
or other activities excluded from the above definition of research and
development.
Some firms find the National Science Foundation definitions un-
suitable for industrial reseaxch. Robert L. Hershey, former Vice Presi-
dent and Director of E.I. du Pont Nemours & Company, believes that, in a
business sense (as opposed to a scientific sense), a company must think
in terms of research and development. Thus, he stated that du Pont clas-
sified R&D into three categories: (i) improvement of established business,
(ii) exploratory research, and (iii) new venture development [Kershey,
1966].
The Industrial Research Institute, representing some 230 industrial
companies with large R&D programs, believes that the three categories of
(i) exploratory research, (ii) high-risk business development, and (iii)
support of existing business are more adequate descriptions of the types




An American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
study indicates that a general accounting definition of R&D that is pre-
cise enough to be used in all companies probably cannot be developed.
It proposes that definitions on an industry-by-industry basis probably
could be developed. The study reports that an analysis of the various
bases of classifying R&D by type has been resolved into a matrix showing
the characteristics of each type based on people, place, purpose, process,
and proceeds. The matrix, shown in figure 16, presents some general cri-
teria that accountants could use to assist industry's research managers
in determining projects that should and those that should not be consid-
ered as valid R&D projects. Although the matrix includes technical sup-
port because it is closely related to R&D, technical support cost should
be excluded as it is not, in actuality, valid R&D [Gellein & Newman, 1973
»
p. JfO].
2. Composition of R&D Costs
Research and development costs can be accumulated and classified'
into materials, labor, and other costs normally treated as overhead.
Salaries of professional and technical personnel and the cost of related
fringe benefits constitute a major element of these costs. Costs of ma-
terials and supplies may be significant in some research efforts because
researchers often need materials that are expensive and difficult to ob-
tain. Other costs may consist primarily of depreciation of buildings and
equipment, maintenance, and taxes.
A major area of dispute is associated with whether or not indi-
rect and general and administrative (G&A) costs applicable to the IR&D
effort should be included in determining the total amount of allocable
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methods in accounting for IR&D and B&P costs. These raethods of composition
include the following:
a. Only direct costs,
b. Hirect costs and G&A costs,
c. Direct costs and all allocahle indirect costs except that
G&A costs are not considered allocable, or
d. Direct costs, allocable indirect costs and G&A costs ap-
plicable to the IR&D effort.
The use of different methods by different contractors tends to create con-
fusion and uncertainty as to actual IR&D and B&P costs when Government
personnel or stockholders attempt to compare the costs of various contrac-
tors.
The charging of indirect costs to IR&D and B&P is addressed in
ASPR subsections 15-205. 35(b) and 15-205. 3(b), respectively. These sub-
sections provide that the composition is to include not only all direct
costs but also all allocable indirect costs, except that G&A costs are
net to be considered allocable to them. It is further stated that both
direct and indirect costs are to be determined on the same basis as if
each IR&D or B&P project were under contract.
The IR&D and B&P questionnaire results indicated that 52 percent
of all surveyed were in favor of the present policy, which stipulates
using direct and indirect cost but not G&A expenses. The method that in-
cludes direct, indirect, and G&A costs was preferred by 23 percent of
those polled; 21 percent favored including only direct costs; ^ percent
favored including direct and G&A costs.
Contrasted with the Department of Defense policy for the compo-
sition of IR&D costs, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) requires that
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the costs of IR&D, whether or not accepted as allowable, must include an
amount for the related indirect and admini strative costs, regardless of
the contractor's accounting practices [GAO Report B-16^912, 1970, p. 19],
In an investigation of the various companies* accounting proce-
dures, the General Accounting Office (GAO) found situations where contrac-
tors did not charge factory overhead and/or G&A expenses to IR&D costs,
particularly that portion of IR&D costs to be absorbed by the contractor.
Consequently, the applicable factory overhead and G&A expenses were al-
located to all Government and commercial work exclusive of IR&D. Hence,
IR&D did not bear its proportionate share of indirect costs, including
G&A expenses, as did all the other work projects [GAO Cost Accounting
Standards Feasibility Report, 1970, p. 56-58].
In a 1965 Army Audit Agency report it was stated that their ex-
perience over the years indicated that contractors generally did not bur-
den IR&D effort but that direct R&D work was burdened [GAO Report B- 16*4-912,
1970, p. 62].
A GAO analysis of seventy-three advance agreements on IR&D for
fiscal year I966 showed that burdening of IR&D was provided for in most
cases. In forty-nine of those cases, the burdening included allocations
of departmental overhead; in seventeen cases, the burdening included al-
locations of departmental and G&A overhead [GAO Report B-16^912, 1970, p.
63].
In the AICPA accounting research study cited earlier, results of
a 1965 survey of accounting practices for company R&D costs showed that
69 percent of the 209 mature companies and 70 percent of the 36 more
2
To burden a cost means to allocate overhead to the cost objective.
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recently developed companies never included any G&A overhead in R&D costs
[Gellein & Newman, 1973. p. 10l].
The GAO stated that IR&D and B&P cost pools should be allocated
an appropriate share of indirect and administrative costs. They rea-
soned that contracted R&D efforts are assessed such overhead charges in
recognition of the fact that the contracted work could not "be performed
without the availability of space, heat, light, service, et cetera, which
items are included as overhead costs and distributed to the company's ac-
tivities. Thus, similar treatment should be given to IR&D and B&P costs
to permit appropriate comparison of costs and to enable equitable treat-
ment of all companies, many of which allocate overhead costs to these
technical efforts. They stated that, while they believed it would be de-
sirable to burden IR&D and related costs fully, they had no strong ob-
jections to not burdening with G&A expenses, as those expenses are nor-
mally relatively small in amount and did not have a material effect [Senate
Armed Services Committee Hearings, 1970, p. 1918^].
Contractors believe that their organizations, pricing structures
and contract obligations vary widely and, consequently, so should their
methods of cost distribution. The result is a wide range of accounting
methods for overhead absorption. They believe that there is, therefore,
no single set of cost accounting principles suitable to satisfy all of
these varying requirements and that imposition of a single directed ac-
counting system results in arbitrary compromises of contract cost distri-
bution and tends to create inequity. Additionally, they think that stan-
dardization of burdening of individual indirect cost elements is not
effective if employed selectively on particular elements of costs, in
that there are numerous task-oriented indirect costs in addition to IR&D
and B&P costs which are susceptible to such treatment. The accounting
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treatment of these other costs also varies widely and not the equity of
distribution to contracts, nor the need to manage the costs, nor the de-
termination of reasonableness is enhanced by a mandatory requirement to
burden them. Contractors feel that full burdening, except for G&A ex-
penses, unreasonably inflates the cost of IR&D and B&P costs because many
of the costs in the full burden are not applicable to IR&D and B&P costs
or, if applicable, are so to a much smaller degeee [CODSIA letter, 23
Sep. 1968, to GAO Defense Division Director],
Some indirect costs are controllable directly in terms of volume
of activity and others are fixed in amount as a consequence of earlier
commitments. Such costs are fairly easily justified and controlled in
relation to volume or the previous commitment, respectively. However,
there are other indirect costs, such as IR&D and E&P, that are determined
largely by management discretion and controlled primarily by periodic ap-
propriations of fixed amounts. Hence, special visibility of their compo-
sition and allocation appears necessary so that the Government and the
contractors can be assured that these costs are expressed in a consistent
and uniform manner and, thus, are reasonably justifiable and controllable.
3. Allocation of Costs
The diversity of contractor activities and their purposes for being
in business raises a variety of problems in accounting for IR&D and B&P
costs and causes many of the differences in accounting practices. Mea-
surement of the costs of research and development effort is possible, and
it is also possible to assign these costs to those responsible for purposes
of budgetary control. On the other hand, it is often very difficult to
assign IR&D and B&P costs to products and to measure the results obtained
from research in terms of sales income or profits. The reasons for this
difficulty are that the outcome of experimental work always involves a
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degree of uncertainty and also that there is often a substantial time lag
"between incurrence of research costs and realisation of the benefits.
These conditions are particularly significant where research of a broad
exploratory nature is carried out. As the objectives of research effort
become more definite and the outcome more predictable, research costs can
be more readily assigned to the products or contracts which benefit.
The purpose of assigning R&D costs to products may be to show how
much is being spent for R&D on each product or product line; it may be to
determine profit or loss by desired product classification; it may be to
obtain product costs for pricing purposes.
In the AICPA accounting research study cited earlier, results of
a 1965 survey of accounting practices for company R&D costs showed that,
for internal reporting purposes, 51 percent of 209 mature companies always
allocated indirect R&D costs as overhead to specific projects. However,
56 percent of 36 more recently developed companies never did so.
The cost of goods and services are recorded when acquired. A
National Association of Accountants (NAA) report indicated that costs
can be classified by "object of expenditure" (such as labor and material),
by "time length of expected usefulness," by "function or department" with-
in the firm, and by the "end object" to which the services or goods con-
tribute (such as a contract) [Bulloch, 1972, p. 12]. Only the object of
expenditure and the length of expected usefulness can be applied to all
goods and services at the instance of acquisition. Some, but not all,
goods and services can be classified by all four methods. However, it
may be impossible ever to relate a specific acquired item to a specific
object.
The NAA research study states that the expected length of useful
service, the function or department and the end object are the most
7h

important for purposes of contract costing. The object of expenditure
may "be useful in determining how one or more of the three other classifi-
cations applies to a given acquired item and its cost, and it is also
relevant where unallowable costs are specifically identified by object
classi fi cati on
.
The NAA study examined cost accounting practices of fifteen de-
fense contractors whose 1970 total contract volume was approximately five
billion dollars. The study found that companies used different proce-
dures and techniques for costing contracts. These differences seemed to
result more from the fact -that past practices were continued than from
philosophical or conceptual disagreement.
The contractors' basic costing philosophy was to charge directly
as much of the costs as was practicable. This objective was accomplished
by manufacturing on a job order basis and by organizing the company so
that the defense contract business was administered separately from com-
mercial business. This was possible because the major products and ser-
vices bought by the Government under cost based contracts were frequently
unique to Government needs. A previous NAA report had similar findings
[NAA Report No. 29 > 1955 » P« 52]. It found that the organization of the
R&D unit and the nature of the work accomplished affected the extent to
which costs could be assigned to divisions by direct charge.
The 1972 NAA study found in the analysis that the indirect cost
flow could be classified into prior pools, final pools and, ultimately,
assignment could be made to a final cost objective. The prior pools cat-
egory included cost pools where costs were allocated to other prior pools,
to final pools and occasionally to contracts. The final pools category
represented cost pools whose costs were allocated only to final cost ob-
jectives — with the exception that IR&D projects, which were treated as
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final cost pools, received allocations from final pools and then were
allocated to contracts. The objective of these various types of pools
was to assign indirect costs to specific contracts or to commercial busi-
ness. Figure 17 summarizes this general structure of the indirect costing
process. Costs might not have actually been recorded ag;ainst commercial
business or firm fixed price contracts when the costs were unnecessary
for determining billing amounts, but the process would have been carried
through to totals in order to divide the costs correctly between proper
segments of the business so that cost reimbursement type contracts were
charged with their share of costs [Bulloch, 1972, p. 53] •
k. Basis for Allocation
The basis for allocation of IR&D to Government contracts or simi-
lar cost objectives may be one of the following [Cost Accounting Standards
Board Disclosure Statement, 1972]:
a. Sales
b. Cost of sales
c. Cost input (direct material, direct labor, other direct
costs and applicable overhead)
d. Total cost incurred (cost input plus G&A expenses)
e. Prime cost (direct material, direct labor and other di-
rect cost)
f. Processing or conversion cost (direct labor and appli-
cable overhead)
g. Direct labor dollars
h. Direct labor hours
i. Machine hours
j . Usage
k. Unit of product
1. Direct material cost
m. Total payroll dollars (direct and indirect employees)
n. Headcount or number of employees (direct and indirect
employees)
Some companies analyze each project when assigning IR&D and B&P
costs. In this process, various bases of allocation are utilized to mea-
sure the incidence of these costs according to responsibility assumed and
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indirect IR&D and B&P costs together and allocate them to divisions on a
single broad basis. Often, research and development expense constitutes
one item in the group of central staff department expenses to be spread
over operating divisions. Some companies attempt to find a basis for al-
location which measures long-run benefits that the various divisions re-
ceive.
When research is concerned with increasing general knowledge and
with new products unrelated to those currently manufactured, it is dif-
ficult to determine what divisions will benefit; and any basis for allo-
cating costs is likely to be arbitrary. While such research may increase
future profits, it has no traceable relationship to current manufacturing
and selling activities.
Some of the allocation bases reported to be in actual use by com-
panies are as follows |_NAA Report No. 29 1 1955 » P» 5^]>
a. Direct divisional research expense
b. Sales value of shipments
c. Cost of goods sold
d. Conversion cost of products manufactured
e. Allocation ratios established by negotiation with de-
partment heads
f. A composite of divisional sales, net or gross, and in-
vestment.
It was found in the 1972 NAA study [Ref. 6, p. 52] that the IR&D
work of defense contractors was divided, without exception, among pro-
jects. Costs, with the exception of G&A expense, were accumulated for
each project as if it were a contract. Projects were charged for direct
materials, direct labor, other direct charges and the overhead which was
related to the labor and material input. Similarity between contracts
and IR&D projects ended at that point. G&A expense was charged to con-
tracts based either upon incurred manufacturing and engineering cost or
upon the manufacturing and engineering costs of that part of the contract
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included in the cost of sales figure. IR&D costs, on the other hand,
became part of the G&A cost pool rather than receiving a share of that
pool or were allocated to contracts on the same basis as G&A expense with-
out first receiving a charge for that expense. An exception to this pro-
cedure existed when there was a central laboratory, in that, along with
the divisions, the laboratory was charged for a share of corporate G&A
costs. The total (including allocated G&A costs) was allocated to divi-
sions on the basis of cost of sales or incurred costs or some similar gen-
eralized basis and was then applied to contracts as division level G&A
expense was allocated.
5« Deferral or Immediate Recognition of IR&D Costs
In accordance with the usual accounting concept of assets and the
matching concept of income determination, costs incurred in a current
period but expected to benefit some future period should be deferred now
and then charged against the revenue of the future period, Early ac-
counting literature and court decisions favored deferral of IR&D costs.
However, practice has changed so that most IR&D costs are now recognized
as expenses when incurred, Companies that have long experience with the
subject generally defend the current practice as sound and necessary un-
der the competitive conditions in which they operate [Gellein & Newman,
1973, P. 23].
Some reasons offered for viewing PR&D costs as a current expense
are as follows [NAA Report No. 29, 1955, p. ^5]:
a. Research costs are recurring annual costs similar to ad-
vertising and general administrative expense.
b. Benefits accruing from research often cannot be measured
and related to sales of any specific period.
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c. xThe success or failure of a research project may remain
indeterminate for several years. It is, therefore, conservative to ex-
pense research costs rather than to admit an asset of uncertain value
into the balance sheet which may later distort net income of a future
period when it is written off.
d. The useful life of a successful research and development
project frequently cannot be determined with sufficient accuracy to jus-
tify amortization.
e. When research and development is continuously undertaken,
expensing all research and development costs tends to offset the nonmatch-
ing of costs and revenues of individual projects. As a result, annual net
income is as accurate as it would be if costs were capitalized and amor-
tized on a specific contract basis.
Exceptions to the treatment of research and development as an
expense nay occur in the following situations [NAA Report Mo. 29 » 1955
»
P. <]; .'
a. Some definite assurance exists concerning the success of
an individual project, as in the case of a patent, formula, copyright, et
cetera.
b. Research and development occurs irregularly and the bene-
fits derived therefrom are expected to carry over to future periods.
c. Research and development is performed on a contract basis
for the government and others.
d. There is a direct association of research and development
to products such as the cost of pilot production runs, and the prepara-
tion of new markets and territories.
The AICPA study included a survey which showed that the predomi-
nant industry practice was to recognize R&D costs as expenses as they are
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incurred. Better than 90 percent of those surveyed indicated that R&D
expenditures should be written off as incurred. Approximately 60 percent
felt that expensing R&D costs as they were incurred had little effect on
being able to evaluate the profit performance of a company [Gellein &
Newman i 1973 i P« 102Ji The IR&D and B&P questionnaire results indicated
that 86 percent of those surveyed believed that these costs should be
expensed rather than capitalized.
The aforementioned AICPA study indicated that the two-type clas-
sification of costs has submerged a type of costs with unique character-
istics that is identified as "business-preserving costs." These costs
are discretionary costs which are not related directly to current opera-
tions but are incurred to preserve the profitability of an enterprise
over the long term. IR&D costs, by their nature, are a major element of
business-preserving costs. Since these costs are intended to benefit the
future rather than the present, the theory underlying current practice
would tend to require that the costs be deferred and amortized over the
future periods that they are intended to benefit [Gellein & Newman, 1973 >
p. 6], However, the requirements of theory are difficult to apply prac-
tically, so, costs incurred in continuing research programs are recognized
as expenses. Many of the factors pertaining to continuing research also
pertain to development projects, but those projects have a greater prob-
ability of successful exploitation and a closer link with expected revenue.
The AICPA study concludes that costs of a project should be de-
ferred only if they meet the following criteria [Gellein & Newman, 1973
»
P. 7];
a. A significant project to develop a single product or a
series of related products or processes should be estab-
lished and well defined.
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b. The Board of Directors should formally approve the project.
c. Technical feasibility of the products or processes to be
developed should be determined and documented.
d» Reasonable probability of meeting planned time schedules
for development, production, and sale or use of the pro-
ducts or processes should be demonstrable.
e. The estimated amount and the probable timing of potential
revenue should be reasonably established,
f
.
Only costs incurred after management has evaluated and
approved a project should be deferred.
g. Deferred costs should be limited to those that are rea-
sonably allocable to specific future periods or future
contracts,
h. A formal program should be established to periodically
evaluate the project and to write off the costs that ex-
ceed expected revenue less completion and selling costs.
The cost deferral policy for the Department of Defense currently
is that IP&D costs which were incurred in previous accounting periods are
unallowable, except when a contractor has developed a specific product at
his own risk in anticipation of recovering the development costs in the
sale price of the product, provided that [ASPR Section 15-205. 35(e) , 1973]:
a. The total, amount of IR&D costs applicable to the product
can be identified.
b. The proration of such costs to sales of the product is
reasonable.
c. The contractor had no Government business during the time
that the costs were incurred or he did not allocate Ifi&D
costs to Government contracts except to prorate the cost
of developing a specific product to the sales of that
product , and
d. No costs of current IR&D programs are allocated to Govern-
ment work except to prorate the costs of developing a
specific product to the sales of that product,
*
ASPR cost principles have generally discouraged or di sallowed
the recovery of deferred research and development expenses. The Govern-
ment's policy may reflect a concern that contractors would capitalize the
costs of successful R&D projects and amortize such costs over the sales
life of the resulting products while, at the same time, write off during
the current period the expenses associated with unsuccessful projects.
Hence, the Government would be paying indirect costs on its contracts for
unsuccessful ventures. However, capitalization of R&D could possibly have
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for the Government because the contractor would be effecting his own
financing in order to perform the R&D and the decision-making involved
would include an incentive for efficiency.
C. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS FOR IR&D AND B&P COSTS
Cost accounting standards are designed to provide better guidelines
for the use and limitation of alternate methods by contractors in report-
ing the cost of performance under negotiated contracts, with improved
comparability, reliability and consistency. The relationship between al-
lowability and allocability may be the single most important factor that
is essential to the preparation of an IR&D and B&P cost accounting stan-
dard which will be capable of producing reliable, consistent, and compar-
able cost data with due regard to fairness for all concerned parties. As
has been mentioned previously, the allocability cf a cost is one of sev-
eral factors affecting its allowability, but the subject of allowability
should not influence the techniques of allocating and distributing costs
to the various cost objectives.
There is a need for limiting the number of alternative methods of re-
porting costs. This need is indicated in a statement of William J. Casey,
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, before the Conference
on Financial Reporting in May 1972, when he said [journal of Accountancy,
Oct. 1972, p. 72]:
It is my belief that a further reduction of permissible alternative ac-
counting treatments in identical circumstances must be made. There is
simply no basis for alternatives when fact situations are identical.
Further emphasis for this point of view is provided by an American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) study which endorses greater
restrictions on alternative methods of accounting for R&D costs [Gellein
& Newman, 1973, p. 66].
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Proper determination of the costs of negotiated contracts through
consistent application of contractors' cost accounting practices is a
major intent of the initial accounting standards. The standards require
that a contractor follow consistently his own cost accounting practices
as disclosed in the Disclosure Statement or as established by his own
cost accounting practices if no Disclosure Statement is required. The
contractor is required to follow consistently the same cost accounting
practices in estimates of price, accumulations of cost and reports of
costs under a given covered contract. Further, the contractor must fol-
low consistently Ms classification of costs for the same purpose in like
circumstances as either direct costs or as indirect costs (_Cost Account-
ing Standards Board Report, 1.972, pp. 19-22].
Whereas consistency relates to improving intra-contractor comparabil-
ity when circumstances are alike, uniformity is designed to promote
inter-contractor comparability when circumstances are alike. The present
ASPR addresses itself to uniformity in general terms. ASPR states the
following with respect to the composition of total cost £aSPR Section
15-201.1, 1973]:
In ascertaining what constitutes costs, any generally accepted method of
determining or estimating costs that is equitable under the circumstances
may be used.
ASPR states that the following are to be considered in determining the
allocability of individual cost items [ASPR Section 15-201.2, 1973]:
Standards promulgated by the Cost Accounting Standards Board, if appli-
cable, otherwise, generally accepted accounting principles and practices
appropriate to the particular circumstances.
To achieve greater uniformity among the many contractors in regard
to the cost accounting principles that they follow, the Comptroller Gen-
eral's feasibility report [Ref. 3l] on cost accounting standards and the
8^

law that created the Cost Accounting Standards Board (Public Law 91-379)
both provide "do's" and "don't's" for uniformity specifications. The
following is a listing of those "do's" and "don't's" as perceived by the
industry member of the Cost Accounting Standards Board [Dana, 1972, p. 93].
a. Don't prescribe a single method,
b. Don't eliminate diversity in the way contractors do busi-
ness.
c. Don't be so specific as to try to recognize all possible
situations.
d. Do establish criteria for the use of alternative methods,
or do narrow the use of alternatives when criteria cannot
be established.
e. Do take into account the probable cost of implementation
compared to the probable benefits of new standards.
f
.
Do support each new standard with conclusive empirical
data derived from adequate research.
Robert N. Anthony, a distinguished professor, former Government execu-
tive, and a consultant to the Cost Accounting Standards Board, has indi-
cated that there are two sequential stages in the development of standards
[Harvard Business Review, May 1970, pp. 125-128], The first stage should
be the development of a few underlying, basic concepts; the second should
be the development of standards based on those concepts. He emphasized
that the development of detailed rules and procedures is not properly a
part of this effort. The first step should provide in broad terms what
total costs incurred In an accounting period should include. The next
step in the conceptual foundation stage should provide how this total cost
is to be assigned to the several cost objectives of that period. Princi-
pal components of the total costs incurred in a period which should be
considered are (i) types of resources for proper inclusion, (ii) pricing
of these resources, and (iii) measurement of the amount applicable to a
single period for resources that provide services to more than one ac-
counting period. Anthony pointed out that attention should also be given




In determining how to divide the total cost among the several cost
objectives, Anthony suggested that consideration first be given to the
definition of direct costs so that it will include as many cost elements
as possible, thus leaving a small indirect cost category. He suggested
that the solution to the problem rests in identifying what physical in-
puts should be treated as direct and then deciding how to price those
inputs. The second consideration concerns providing a fair share of indi-
rect costs to contracts. This entails specifying the meaning of homo-
geneous pools and deciding among the possible ways of allocating the to-
tal of each pool to cost objectives. A possible way of governing the
method of allocating the total cost in a pool to the relevant cost ob-
jectives is that of arranging the methods of allocation in a conceptual
desirability hierarchy and specifying that the most desirable method that
is feasible in the circumstances be applied. The residuals would consist
of costs for which no logical basis for allocation existed; this pool
would undoubtedly contain some G&A costs.
After the few broad concepts have been developed, standards for indi-
vidual elements of cost can be set. Anthony submitted that each topic
for a standard should define alternative circumstances that warrant dif-
ferent methods of cost assignment and should state the method or methods
appropriate under each of the circumstances.
If the assumption is made that the conceptual stage for cost account-
ing standards has been completed and that the "do's" and "don't's" of the
law and the GAO feasibility report are valid and capable of being prac-
tically applied, then a cost accounting standard for IR&D and B&P costs
can be developed. From the discussion of the allocability of IR&D and
B&P costs earlier in this chapter, it is evident that the areas of concern
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are the composition of costs in the IR&D and B&P pools, the methods of
their allocation, the bases for their distribution, and resolution of
when these costs should be expensed and capitalized.
The IR&D and B&P questionnaire sought answers to problems that are
associated with cost accounting standards. Perceptions on the subject
are indicated as follows:
a. Statement: There is need for explicit guidance on compo-
sition of IR&D and B&P costs and the allocation of these costs to speci-
fic cost objectives. Response: only 33 percent of industry agreed while
72 percent of Government agreed.
b. Statement: A cost accounting standard on IR&D and B&P
costs should deal only with criteria and policies. Response: 93 percent
of industry and 67 percent of Government agreed.
c. Statement: A cost accounting standard should require
that each contractor establish and adhere to a reasonable IR&D and B&P
cost policy rather than a uniform policy. Response: 93 percent of in- .
dustry and 56 percent of Government agreed.
d. Statement: A cost accounting standard for IR&D and B&P
should address the classification, accumulation, and allocation of IR&D
and B&P costs. Response: 57 percent of industry and 83 percent of Gov-
ernment were in favor.
e. Statement: IR&D and B&P costs should be handled as in-
dependent issues when formulating cost accounting standards. Response:
77 percent of industry and 72 percent of Government agreed.
The questionnaire results again indicate that there is disagreement
between industry and Government. However, there appears to be a consen-
sus that a possible cost accounting standard should not be too specific,
that it should deal with policies rather than procedures, and that it
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should consider the classification, accumulation, and allocation of IR&D
and MP costs. It is of note that the majority feel that IR&D and B&P
costs should be separate subjects with respect to forthcoming cost ac-
counting standards.
Anthony [jRef. 3] suggested that a hierarchy of allocation methods may
be desirable for distributing the total accumulated cost. However, the
questionnaire asked if it would be desirable for the Government to estab-
lish a hierarchy of allocation methods for the selection of an appropriate
allocation base, founded on achieving the most realistic representation
of the beneficial or causal relationship that is practical in the cir-
cumstance. Only 33 percent of industry and UM- percent of Government re-
spondents agreed with the idea.
Present Department of Defense policy is to allocate IR&D and B&P costs
on the same basis as the general and administrative (G&A) expense grouping
of the profit center in which such costs are incurred. The questionnaire
results indicated that this method is overwhelmingly acceptable; 87 per-
cent of industry and 83 percent of Government respondents agreed with
this procedure.
Investigating further, the questionnaire sought to discover if IR&D
costs could be identified with the correct cost objectives. The question-
naire stated that it is practical to make a preponderant identification
of IR&D to the segment or segments of the organization which are likely
to benefit. A difference of opinion exists, as the survey replies show
that only 37 percent of industry agreed while 61 percent of Government
considered the statement correct.
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IV. ALLOWABILITY OF IR&D AND B&P COSTS
Allowability means that a cost may be charged to a contract and
included in the total price of that contract. It is a procurement con-
cept which affects contract price in negotiated procurements, where the
determination of a fair and reasonable price is made on tha basis of cost
analysis. To allow or not to allow IR&D and B&P costs is a question that
has long occupied the minds of Government procurement decision-makers.
Another is: if IR&D and B&P costs are allowed, what should be the equi-
table way to determine the allowance?
The past Department of Defense (DOD) position on these questions is
indicated by the following statement [Vance, 196^:
It is the policy of the Department of Defense that we should pay our fair
share of a contractor's normal and reasonable costs, including its inde-
pendent research and development costs, with the Government acquiring no
greater rights as a result than accrue to any other customer buying the
contractor's products or companies predominantly engaged in commercial
work. We believe that this policy is most likely to assure a continuing
flow of new technology of importance to the national defense.
A further statement of the same era amplifies the Defense Department's
position [Fubini , 1964]:
In view of the basic presumption in favor of paying the contractor's ne-
cessary costs of doing business, independent research and development
costs should continue to be allowed unless a positive basis for disal-
lowance can be clearly established. Since a company must charge prices
that cover its costs, the burden of proof must be carried by those who
would propose that the Government pay prices that do not fully cover the
contractor's costs.
However, since that time, doubt has arisen as to whether or not there have
been proper controls placed on negotiated contracts to ensure fairness and
reasonableness.
Senator Proxmire, in 1969 > introduced to the Senate a bill [_Senate
Bill 3003 » 1969] that was to provide for more effective control over the
89

expenditure of funds by the Department of Defense and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for IR&D and MP costs. For
negotiated contracts, the bill would not have allowed costs for research
and development unless provision for these costs was specifically in-
cluded in the contract. For any contract, no R&D costs would have been
allowed unless they provided a direct or indirect benefit to the work
performed under the contract.
Under S.3003, the cost of preparing successful or unsuccessful bids
or proposals for negotiated contracts would have been allowed if the sub-
ject matter was applicable to the program of the agency concerned, How-
ever, the allowed amount was not to exceed one percent of the direct ma-
terial and direct labor costs of the contract to be performed.
In hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1970 j_Senate
Armed Services Committee Hearings, 1970, pp. 1641-75] > Senator Proxmire
charged that the Government received no direct or specific product or
benefit related to its needs and also received no license, patent, royalty
or right for the money it expended for IR&D. He said that IR&D expense
was not directly authorized by the Congress and that it was a "back-door
boondoggle" whose benefits to the Government and the taxpayers were in-
direct, transitory and evanescent at best and were nonexistent at worst.
With regard to the arguments that IR&D is necessary to provide for a
modern industrial technology base, the Senator suggested that the coun-
try's industrial capacity would be far stronger if the Government deter-
mined precisely what R&D was needed, converted the IR&D funds to regular
R&D contracts, and then had these contracts performed by companies not
presently conducting defense business.
Senator Proxmire felt that the worst possible thing that could happen
would be to have a single, Government-wide R&D system modeled on the DOD-
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NASA system. He believed that the effect of such a system v;ould be similar
to that of "universalizing sin." He stated that to continue paying for
IR&D for a firm's commercial and indirect and general research was illegal.
Further, he felt that industry rather than the Congress was being allowed
to determine and shift national priorities.
The IR&D and B&P questionnaire attempted to obtain opinions regarding
some of Senator Proxmire's charges. The results of the survey indicate
the following:
a. 100 percent of the contractors strongly agree that IR&D
and B&P effort is in the nations' s best interest; 77 percent of the Gov-
ernment personnel either agreed or strongly agreed.
b. 52 percent of the contractors disagreed and 82 percent
of the Government personnel agreed that there are possible inequities to
the Government when contractors develop products under IR&D programs in
the defense/space cost centers and market them in commercial centers.
c. 6^ percent of the contractors disagreed and 88 percent of
the Government personnel agreed that the Government should be entitled to
information and royalty-free rights to any invention arising from IR&D
projects fully or partially supported by the Government.
d. 90 percent of the contractors and M percent of the Gov-
ernment personnel agreed that a contractor's performance of IR&D generally
results in reduced costs to the Government.
From the above questionnaire results it can be observed that the per-
ception of IR&D and its effects greatly depends upon which side of the
negotiating table one occupies.
To make the subject of allowability of IR&D and B&P costs more mean-
ingful, the following pages will address allowability in further detail.
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Then, the related subjects of "reasonableness" and "relevance" will be
discussed, followed by a consideration of the Commission on Government
Procurement's recommendation for these costs.
A. ALLOWABILITY
Allowability, in most cases, is expressly provided for in regulatory
or contractual provisions. A contracting agency may include in its' con-
tract terms or in its procurement regulations a provision that it will
refuse to allow certain costs incurred by contractors that are unreason-
able in amount or contrary to public policy.
To further understand the meaning of an allowable cost, the following
is a proposed definition of an unallowable cost [Federal Register, Vol.
38, No. 61, 30 Mar. 1973 , p. 8279]:
Any cost item(s), or the total costs of any organizational activity, which
because of applicable laws, regulations, and/or contractual agreements
cannot be included as costs used for pricing, billing, or settlement of
a particular prime contract or subcontract.
Public Law 91-441, Section 203 [84 Stat. 904 (1970)], requires that
funds authorized for appropriation to DOD are not to be made available
for payment of IR&D and B&P costs unless the work for which payment is
made has, in the opinion of the Secretary of Defense, a potential rela-
tionship to a military function or operation and unless conditions are
met for reasonableness, which, in turn, is determined by either advance
agreement or by use of a formula based on a company's history of IR&D and
B&P costs.
A contractor's costs of IR&D are allowable as indirect costs provided
that they are allocated to all of his work. A contractor's B&P costs
are allowable because they are considered a part of the cost of doing
business with the Government. The B&P costs are allowable for both the
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successful and the unsuccessful bid as an indirect cost [DPC 90, 1 Sep.
197l]. (it is of interest to note that 8^- percent of the combined Gov-
ernment and contractor population surveyed in the questionnaire was in
favor of allowing both successful and unsuccessful bids.)
Policy is inconsistent among the various Government agencies as to
the allowability of IR&D and B&P costs. This policy variance results
primarily from whether the agency's reasoning is dominated by concern for
production procurement or by concern for R&D support. Agencies that pro-
cure mostly products tend to be more restrictive in allowing IR&D, whereas
research-oriented agencies are typically very liberal with IR&D allowances.
There is strong justification for each type of policy in its respective
circumstances. However, injustice occurs when a policy is applied out-
side of the circumstances for which it was designed. There appears to
be a need to develop a Government-wide policy which will fit the varying
circumstances of procurement, make clear what is right and when, elimi-
nate contradictory authority, and clearly establish the regulations.
In the present DOD regulations for allowability, no attempt has been
made to make a distinction between "research" and "development," nor has
there been an attempt to differentiate between "basic" and "applied"
research or "concept formulation studies." This present policy differs
from past policies wherein there was a differentiation between these var-
ious categories. Independent research costs formerly were allowed, pro-
vided they were allocated to all work of the contractor; independent de-
velopment was allowed to the extent that the development related to the
product lines for which the Government had contracts with the contractor,
and provided that these costs were allocated to all work of the contrac-
tor for such product lines [ASPR Section 15-205.35, 1959].
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Restrictions on allowance of IR&D and B&P have been met with sustained
resistance by industry. Almost unanimously , R&D performers believe that
some independent and discretionary R&D funds are essential, to efficient
performance and to long-term survival for the organization. The degree
to which a company maintains an IR&D program is related to the company's
assessment of the impact of future technology on its ability to market
its products. However, under negotiated procurement circumstances, the
Government determines the size of the IR&D program in which it will par-
ticipate and thus determines allowability.
The proper handling of cost overruns above the allowed ceilings has
been an item in the allowance controversy. The IR&D and B&P question-
naire sought opinions on this subject. The following responses indicate
a large division of opinion between industry and Government representa-
tives:
a. Statement: Presently there are sufficient guidelines for
excluding IR&D overruns from indirect costs. Response: 80 percent of
industry agreed while only 22 percent of Government personnel agreed.
b. Statement: IR&D overruns should be included in indirect
costs for allocation to both commercial and Government work. Response:
77 percent of the contractors and 22 percent of Government agreed.
The handling of these specific unallowable costs come under the do-
main of a recent cost accounting standard. This standard requires that,
where the total of the allocable and otherwise allowable costs exceeds
a ceiling-price provision in a contract, full direct and indirect cost
allocation is to be made to the contract cost objective, in accordance
with established cost accounting practices and standards which regularly
govern a given entity's allocations to Government contract cost objec-
tives. It further indicates that, in any determination of an unallowable
9^

cost overrun, this amount is to be identified in terras of the excess of
allowable costs over the ceiling amount, rather than through specific
identification of particular cost items or cost elements. The standard
provides that specific identification of unallowable costs is not required
in circumstances where, based upon considerations of materiality, the Gov-
ernment and the contractor reach agreement on an alternate method that
satisfies the purpose of the standard [Federal Register, Vol. 3^> No. 172,
6 Sep. 1973, P. 24199]. This standard for unallowable costs, effective
1 January 1974, should provide more clarity in an area that has been a
source of confusion in the past.
With regard to whether or not DOD policy on IR&D and B&P costs is
such that it encourages companies to conduct independent research and de-
velopment, the questionnaire results indicate that both industry and Gov-
ernment personnel believe that it does; 76 percent of those polled agreed
that there is encouragement while 24 percent disagreed. Hence, DOD re-
strictions on the allowance of these costs appears not to be very detri-
mental to the effort.
IR&D and B&P costs have traditionally been allowed by DOD and have
been treated as an indirect cost item or an element of a company's over-
head. However, techniques other than cost recovery through overhead
allocation have been considered as alternatives to this traditional meth-
od. These alternatives include (i) recovery by means of a direct con-
tract and (ii) recovery by means of profit margin.
1. Direct R&D Contracts
A chief proponent for the use of R&D contracts in place of IR&D
funds* has been Senator Proxmire. He stated that, if the Government needed
further to fund pure research, it should be accomplished through funds
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furnished by the National Science Foundation [Senate Armed Services
Committee Hearings, 1970, p. 206l].
In response to those who recommended replacement of IR&D funds
with direct R&D contracts, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, stated that the use of direct contract R&D in
this expanded role would remove most of the advantages that make IR&D de-
sirable. He emphasized that the contract R&D programs of the DOD were
projects that were evaluated and selected from among a much larger number
of possible alternatives. Making the correct choice of the best projects
is difficult because the number of needs and possible solutions is large,
funds are limited, and proper management necessitates that the possibil-
ity of error be considered. Dr. Foster felt that a portion of R&D pro-
grams, albeit small, should remain independent. He pointed out that the
difficulty of choosing a course of action is an old story to R&D enter-
prises and the usual solution is a combination made up of projects that
are controlled from the top down, projects that are proposed from the
bottom and approved at the top, and projects that are initiated and con-
trolled at the bottom. Statistics indicate that IR&D allowed on defense
contracts is a small percentage (about k percent) of the DOD contract R&D
budget, is centrally controlled by the agency with respect to funding and
general subject area only, and is not subject to the same detailed manage-
ment reviews as the 96 percent balance of R&D expenditures. Thus, it is
aimed at exploiting the independent, original and creative thinking of
contractors and broadening the support base available to the Defense
Department. Dr. Foster's view is that both private initiative and di-
rected developments are necessary, but at different times and in different
places in the development cycle; the genius of the American industrial
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system is that it is geared to use the creativity of all participants
[Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, 1970, pp. 1958-59].
The number of IR&D projects performed is staggering. Cognizant
military agencies' bookshelves are filled with volumes of contractors'
brochures describing the many projects; many more projects are conducted
by the multitude of smaller contractors. The Government could not ac-
complish all of the reviews and comparisons required to contract directly
for IR&D without substantially increasing the resources it noe devotes
to the technical evaluation and contracting function. Additionally, di-
rect contracting for the many IR&D projects would involve a substantial
time-lag becuase of time required for review of projects, preparation of
the budget, congressional action, and subsequent contractual actions.
The projects would tend to be narrower in scope due to the increased re-
quirement to conform to specific DOD desires and, hence, technological
innovation would be stinted.
Industry has emphasized that Government contracted R&D cannot
effectively substitute for independent R&D because the Government cannot
conceive all the ideas worth following up with R&D effort; it cannot ef-
fectively act as sole judge for all embryonic ideas; and it cannot prac-
tically administer such a nationalized effort unless, of course, the
technical experts now working for industry are transferred to Government
payrolls [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, 1970, p. 1812].
Another response from industry is related to the suggestion that
Government should more closely specify and control R&D for the purpose of
cost reduction. Industry stresses that the Government is not buying IR&D
but is buying goods and services, the price of which includes a fair por-
tion of the applicable IR&D and other indirect costs. They point out
that there is no choice of either allowing IR&D as overhead or contrasting
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for it directly. They believe that the choice is that of either the
Government accepting IR&D as a necessary business expense or denying that
IR&D is of value to the continuing national technological superiority
[MA White Paper, 1969, p. 7].
The DOD feels that it would be impractical to channel funds now
allowed for IR&D to the National Science Foundation because it would mean
the loss of the generation of technical ideas. They believe that the
drive to limit expenditures would be misdirected if it resulted in stif-
ling the flow of industry R&D aimed at solving new problems [Senate Armed
Services Committee Hearings, 1970, p. 1997].
The General Accounting Office (GAO) believes that direct contract
support, as an alternative to IR&D, merits consideration. They have
pointed out that this method could eliminate excessive and consequent
waste of effort and provide assurance that projects of significant inter-
est to the Government would actually be performed and that the Government
would receive data and a royalty-free license to any invention arising
from the work [GAO Report B- 16^9 12, 1970, p. 23].
The IR&D and B&P questionnaire asked addressees to indicate their
most favored of the alternative ways to allocate or recover IR&D and E&P
costs. The combined contractor and Government personnel response was as
follows: Continuation of recovery through overhead allocation was se-
lected by 79 percent; recovery via a direct contract or grant was chosen
by 8 percent; and recovery through profit was selected by another 8 per-
cent. None suggested other ways to allocate or recover these costs. Two
respondents provided no opinion.
2. IR&D as a Profit Factor
It has been suggested that IR&D be treated as a profit factor
instead of allowing it as an acceptable contract overhead cost. This
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method would entail increasing the profit level sufficiently to reimburse
contractors for their IR&D efforts. Proponents have emphasized that this
approach would help ensure that contractors manage IR&D programs with the
same concern for economy as they would have if they were in an actual
competitive environment. They indicated that this approach would help
assure that unsponsored R&D was actually something of potential value to
the contractor and that it would help prevent build-up of unproductive
effort. An additional advantage considered is that of minimizing the a-
mount of administrative effort required by Government when using this
approach [GAO Report B-l6^912, 1970, p. 23].
A DOD study group offered objections to treating IR&D as a profit
factor rather than as an allowable cost [CODSIA letter to GAO Defense
Division Director, 23 Sep. 1968, Attachment H], There might be a tend-
ency to apply the same profit factor for IR&D to all contractors, and
this would be inappropriate because of the varying degrees of participa-
tion in R&D work in different industries and firms. It would be neces-
sary to increase the rate of profit to cover the agreed amount of IR&D,
but the Government negotiators might not apply a fee allowance equitably
among different contractors; or the profit rate might be raised beyond
the statutory limits. Allowance of IR&D costs as a profit element might
deprive the Government of assurance that the contractor actually would
continue to perform IR&D. The GAO felt that the objections presented were
not insurmountable and that many would be equally applicable to other con-
troversial items which were considered in negotiating contract prices.
Industry feels that this approach is unrealistic, in that increased
cost disallowances in negotiated procurement serve, in practice, only to
reduce profit margins, not to increase them. They fear that contractors
would be forced to pay for R&D costs out of funds that are their reward
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for the risks to which the firms expose their assets. They submitted
that declarations of intent to allow higher profits are easily and often
made at the policy levels but that, unfortunately, pious words about in-
creased profits tend to remain just that and find few supporters among
Government negotiators. They noted, however, that this approach would
presumably surrender the controls which are inherent in treating IR&D as
an element of cost and would recognize that competitive forces and nego-
tiation pressure would keep the profit margins under control [Senate Armed
Services Committee Hearings, 1970, p. I869].
The Department of Defense feels that the profit approach is open
to serious question because they would have no practicable way of con-
trolling the contractor* s use of profit dollars once the contractor agrees
to the profit. Thus, there would be no way for DOD to prevent the con-
tractor from using profit dollars for commercial IR&D of from not per-
forming IR&D at all and, thereby, increasing current profit. On the other
hand, overhead costs would be subject to audit, except for firm fixed
price contracts, and would not be paid if they were not incurred [Senate
Armed Services Committee Hearings, 1970, p. 199^-].
The profit-factor method would recognize that IR&D and B&P costs
are applicable to future rather than current operations. There would be
no disputes over disallowance of costs because there would not be any
consideration of IR&D and B&P costs; there would only be consideration
of the amount of the profit margin allowed. Contractors would be required
to consider IR&D and B&P effort as a trade-off between investment in the
future and maximum current earnings.
DOD has no reliable means of determining accurately what actual
contract costs are and, as a consequence, what actual profit is. They are
wholly dependent on the contractor's records. Thus, DOD could not be sure
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that it had actually awarded the contractor through his profit the
compensation for IR&D effort that it had intended when the contract was
negotiated.
B. REASONABLENESS
A cost is considered reasonable if, in its nature or amount, it does
not exceed that which would be incurred by an ordinarily prudent person
in the conduct of competitive business. The reasonableness of specific
costs should be examined with particular care in connection with firms or
separate divisions thereof which may not be subject to effective competi-
tive restraints. What is reasonable depends upon a variety of considera-
tions and circumstances involving both the nature and amount of the cost
in question. In determining the reasonableness of a given cost, consi-
deration should be given to the following questions:
a. Is the cost of a type that is generally recognized as both
ordinary and necessary for the conduct of the contractor's business or the
performance of the contract?
b. Are the restraints or requirements which are imposed by
such factors as sound business practices, arm's length bargaining, fed-
eral and state laws and regulations, and contract terms and specifications
applicable in the particular instance?
c. Would a prudent businessman allow the cost under the cir-
cumstances, considering his responsibilities to the owners of the busi-
ness, his employees, his customers, the Government, and the public at
large?
d. Are there significant deviations from the established
practices of the contractor which may unjustifiably increase contract
costs [ASPR Section 15-201.3, 1973]?
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Effective price competition ensures the reasonableness of a prospective
price. If competition is absent, or is based on technical proficiency
rather than price, the Government must beware, because a contractor's costs
may not reflect the most efficient and economical management of the busi-
ness. Moreover, a contractor free of competitive pressure vri.ll seek to
extract as much profit as the buyer is willing to pay.
1. Advance Agreements and Formulas
The Congress dictated through Public Law 91-*j41 [Ref . ?l] that
reasonableness for the largest contractors was to be determined by use of
advance agreements. Defense Procurement Circular 90 \Jief . 22\ implement-
ed the congressional mandate. It states that any company which received
payments, either as a prime contractor or subcontractor, in excess of $2
million from DOD for IR&D and B&P in a fiscal year is required to negoti-
ate an advance agreement with the Government. This agreement establishes
a ceiling for allowability of IR&D and B&P costs for the following year.
Computation of the amount of IR&D and B&P costs, to determine whether
the $2 million criterion was reached, is to include only those recover-
able IR&D and B&P costs allocated during the company's previous fiscal
year to all DOD prime contracts and subcontracts for which the submission
and certification of costs or pricing data was required in accordance
with 10 U.W. Code 2306(f). The computation is to include full burdening
in the same manner as if the IR&D and B&P projects were contracted for,
except that G&A is not to be applied. Contractors which meet the $2 mil-
lion threshold are to submit technical and financial information to sup-
port their proposed IR&D and B&P programs in accordance with guidance
furnished by the Defense Department's IR&D Technical Evaluation Group.
Results of the technical evaluation performed by this group, including
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determina.tion of potential militaxy relationship, are to be made available
to the contractor by the cognizant service's central office. Within the
advance agreement ceiling limitations (maximum dollar amounts of total
IR&D and B&P that will be allowable) , contractors are not required to
3
share IR&D and B&P costs with the Government. In negotiating a ceiling,
in addition to other considerations, particular attention is to be paid
to such factors as [DPC 90, 1 Sep. 197l]s
a. The technical evaluation of the IR&D Technical Evaluation
Group, including the potential relationship of IR&D projects to a mili-
tary function or operation,
b. Comparison with previous year's programs, including the
level of the Government's participation, and
c. Changes in the company's business activities.
For companies not required to negotiate advance agreements, the
reasonableness of allowable IR&D and B&P costs are established separately
by use of an historical cost-based formula, either on a companywide basis
or by profit centers, computed as follows j^DPC 90, 1 Sep. 19?l]]:
a. Determine the ratio of IR&D (B&P) costs to total sales
(or other base acceptable to the contracting officer) for each of the
preceeding three years and average the two highest of these ratios; this
average is called the IR&D (B&P) historical ratio.
b. Compute the average annual IR&D (B&P) costs, using the
two highest of the preceding three years; this is called simply the "average'.'
3Cost sharing from the first dollar of cost, as well as a cost ceil-
ing, was required in past regulations to provide motivation to the con-
tractor for more efficiency. The effect of the cost-sharing agreement
and a dollar ceiling was to require the contractor to spend a greater a-
mount on his IR&D program than the agreed ceiling if he desired to re-
cover the maximum Government share.
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c. IR&D (B&P) costs for the center for the current year which
are not in excess of the product of the contractor's actual total sales
(or other accepted base) for the current year and the IR&D (B&P) histor-
ical ratio — hereafter called the "product" — are to be considered al-
lowable only to the extent the "product" does not exceed 120 percent of
the "average." If the product is less than 80 percent of the "average,"
costs up to 80 percent of the "average" will be allowable.
d. Costs which are in excess of the ceiling computed in (c)
are not allowable, except where the ceiling computed for B&P (iR&D) cost
is reduced in an amount identical to the amount of any increase over the
IR&D (B&P) ceiling computed in (c).
Prior to enactment of Public Law 91-441 and DPC 90, the DOD con-
ducted a thorough and detailed review of the whole area of IR&D and B&P
management and control. They looked at changes that could increase con-
trol without removing or unduly restricting the features of flexibility
and inventiveness upon which the system depends for its value. They se-
lected the dual plan of the negotiated advance agreement and the DOD-
developed formula because they felt it would satisfy both congressional
and DOD concerns while keeping alive the vital independent nature of this
work. An outline of their policy is given below [[Senate Armed Services
Committee Hearings, 1970, pp. 1963-64]:
a. Use individually negotiated advance agreements for the
control and reimbursement of IR&D and B&P costs for approximately 100 of
the larger defense contractors. Such agreements, after a formalized,
detailed technical review of the program, establish a separate dollar
ceiling for the DOD 1 s reimbursement of each of these costs but allow the
contractor to combine the individual amounts into a single pool if he
chooses. The requirement to negotiate an advance agreement is enforced
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by automatically establishing a low threshold for recovery of costs where
no advance agreement exists.
b. Strengthen technical review and evaluation of contractor
IR&D programs (currently established under DOD Instruction 5100.66). Es-
tablish uniform review and evaluation procedures for use throughout the
DOD. The system requires review of a contractor's individual applicable
projects and takes both his accomplishments and his proposed plan into
consi deration
.
c. A data bank is established to provide a centralized body
of IR&D project costs and technical information which is available to the
Government technical community at large.
d. Use the DOD-developed formula for control and determina-
tion of reasonableness of costs for the remaining large number of smaller
companies who recover IR&D and B&P costs. This provides a workable sys-
tem that can be uniformly applied — one that assures results that can be
easily monitored and adjusted as needed.
e. The military departments increase as necessary the support
and resources needed to perform effectively the required IR&D technical
revi ews
.
The Defense Department acknowledged that determination of "rea-
sonable costs" was the major problem in formulating the policy. The DOD
and industry groups worked to achieve an acceptable and equitable solution.
They reasoned that IR&D and B&P are so intimately related and so inter-
dependent that actions taken should be equally applicable to both, that
the amount of IR&D and B&P costs to be accepted by the Government should
be determined by a formula which uses a company's historical use of IR&D
or B&P costs and sales dollars, and that either the Government or industry
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should be permitted to appeal the allowance produced "by the formula in
extraordinary situations [Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, 1970,
P. 1955].
Industry considered the formula approach for the determination
of reasonableness to be acceptable. They felt that the formula should
be based on a combination of previously incurred contractor costs and pro-
jected sales for determination of the ceiling amount of IR&D and MP costs
to be allocated to Government contracts for a prospective period. They
believed that this approach would be applicable for all contractors, re-
gardless of size, except that, in rare and unusual circumstances, either
the Government or the contractor could deviate by using negotiation and
advance agreement. Industry concurred that contractors should be required
to describe their technical programs for review and evaluation by the De-
fense Department on an annual basis. They felt that this process would
serve as a means of enhancing communications between contractors and the
Government and that it would provide a method of dissemination of non-
proprietary information throughout the Government [Senate Armed Services
Committee Hearings, 1970, p. 182l],
A contractor might want to appeal the formula result in situations
where historical data were not available or where there had been an un-
usually rapid expansion or compression of the formula amount due to large
increases or decreases in sales volume in a particular profit center.
Additionally, there could possibly be a case wherein Government solici-
tation necessitated so large an expenditure that application of the for-
mula resulted in disallowance of most of the contractor's B&P expenses.
Industry views advance agreements as having potential for meeting
mutual interests of both Government and industry. However, they feel
that, where the use of such agreements is "encouraged" ( and tends to
106

become mandatory), the concepts of "agreement" and "independence" of IR&D
and MP actually become impaired and, to an extent, cease to exist.
Hence, industry believes that violation of the principle of independence
must be avoided [AIA White Paper, 1969 i P. 111.
An advance agreement could be made on any of several bases. The
agreement could be made by accepting as reasonable the allocable portion
of costs incurred in pursuance of specific projects; it could be estab-
lished as a given percentage of costs incurred, whereby the Government's
allocable share of the stipulated percentage of such costs would be ac-
cepted as reasonable; or it could be established as a maximum dollar
limitation on IR&D and B&P costs. The Congress has stipulated that the
latter method be used.
In practice, IR&D and B&P cost ceilings for advance agreements
are characterized by some form of cost sharing, because the agreements/
do not necessarily allow recovery of the total costs incurred by contrac-
tors. This feature tends to provide incentive for the contractor to be
very cost conscious in pursuit of IR&D and B&P related work.
In response to the desire of the Congress, DOD has included a
provision which, in effect, links the two costs by permitting the con-
tractor to recover costs for IR&D above the negotiated ceiling, provided
that recovery of B&P costs covered by the same agreement is decreased
below its ceiling by a like amount; the B&P costs can be increased by de-
creasing IR&D in a like manner. The ceilings effectively limit reim-
bursement for the combination of IR&D and B&P costs. The linkage is con-
sidered necessary because Government negotiators have, in the past, had
difficulty in determining where one cost ended and the other began. Ad-
ditionally, a GAO investigation discovered that, when a reasonable agree-
ment for IR&D costs had been consented to by both the contractor and the
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Government in a situation where a ceiling was required for IR&D cost.- "but
not for B&P costs, the costs of MP greatly increased in order to accom-
modate the IR&D costs which were in excess of the agreed-upon ceiling
[GAO Report on Review of Bidding Efforts, I967].
The greatest general concern of industry with respect to IR&D and
B&P cost ceilings appears to be that there is no guarantee that contrac-
tors' total expenditures for the IR&D or B&P effort will he recognized by
the Government's methods of determining reasonableness. Industry's feel-
ings are exemplified by the following statement j^CODSIA letter to ASPR
Committee Chairman, 25 April I968J:
The volatile nature of the business and especially the needs generated by
rapid technological change dictate an arrangement whereby any ceilings
should be viewed more in the context of quantitative criteria as opposed
to impenetrable boundaries outside of which contractor activity would not
be recognized as a necessary and reasonable cost of doing business. An
inflexible ceiling would inhibit the exploitation of technical break-
throughs
.
A further concern of industry relates to the fact that contractors nor-
mally employ a relatively stable level of effort for IR&D and the level
is directly controllable by them. On the other hand, B&P costs tend to
fluctuate and depend upon the nature and timing of customers' demands.
A surge of B&P requests could cause serious problems for the relatively
stable IR&D program, because the contractor could attempt to remain with-
in the combined ceiling and thus spend funds for B&P that were previously
designated for IR&D use.
The IR&D and B&P questionnaire responses indicated prevalent
feelings about cost ceilings. These results are as follows:
a. 33 percent of the contractors believed that both IR&D and
B&P costs pools should have ceilings; 88 percent of the Government per-
sonnel agreed that both should have ceilings.
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b. 96 percent of the contractors but only 35 percent of the
Government personnel felt that contractors should not be required to share
IR&D costs within a ceiling limitation determined by an advance agreement.
c. 100 percent of the contractors but only 35 percent of the
Government personnel felt that provision should be made to permit the
contractor to increase recovery of costs for either IR&D or B&P above the
individually negotiated ceilings, provided that recovery of costs for the
other was decreased below its ceiling by a like amount.
Hence, a great dichotomy of opinion is again observed between the
views of contractors and the views of Government contracting personnel.
2. Basis for Negotiation
The importance of having a basis for the determination of rea-
sonableness clearly defined is indicated by a decision of the Board of
Contract Appeals [Appeal of Technical Communications Corp. , ASBCA No.
AS-11931, 67-2 BCA, August 196?]. In that case the contractor contested
the Government contracting officer's decision to make the contractor pay
20 percent of the IR&D costs as an incentive to keep costs down. The
board ruled that the contractor was entitled to reimbursement for a full
100 percent of its IR&D costs on two cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts be-
cause the Government could prove neither that the costs were unreason-
able nor that it had agreed in advance with the contractor to share costs.
Reference to this decision by the Board of Contract Appeals is made to
emphasize that there is a need to reach an advance agreement. Contrac-
tors could conceivably refuse to enter into advance agreements and, there-
fore, put the burden of proof of reasonableness on the Government after
costs had been incurred. Government needs to establish what the reason-




If disallowances are made after the costs are incurred, the
Government exposes itself to the charge that disallowances are based on
hindsight and, hence, do not consider all the uncertainties that existed
at the time the costs were incurred. The General Accounting Office had
reported recently that most agreements are not negotiated before costs
are incurred [GAO Report B-16703^, 1973, p. 20]. They have made an ex-
cellent recommendation that calls for negotiating advance agreements
either prior to cost incurrence or early in the contractor's fiscal year.
The IR&D and MP questionnaire indicated that both industry and Govern-
ment personnel are in favor of this; 86 percent of the respondents agreed
that is important for agreement to be reached in advance of the incur-
rence of costs in categories where reasonableness is difficult to deter-
mine.
The negotiation process is intended to be a very thorough and
stringent process, designed to prevent unreasonable costs. The process
is intended to be a deterrent to excess spending by providing an effec-
tive cost surveillance system. However, in attempting to control costs
in order to ensure reasonableness, consistent negotiation procedures have
not been evident. The GAO has found that, in many instances, the corre-
lation between the factors considered and the dollar effect of the factors
has not been evident; they also found that inconsistencies had resulted
in inequities to some contractors [GAO Report B-l6703^» 1973 1 P« 23].
What are the most effective and practical techniques to use for
determining reasonableness of these costs? The questionnaire asked this
question and the response of the combined survey population indicated
the following: 32 percent believed technical evaluation to be best; 10
percent felt industrial norms by industry group was best; 2^4- percent
chose the use of an historical record for each contractor. The remainder
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of the respondents chose a combination of the three methods or indicated
other methods such as competitive pressure and sound management, evalua-
tion of management including measurement of company profit and return on
investment in defense work, historical record and realistic forecast,
technical and cost evaluation, and treatment the same as for other over-
head elements.
The Department of Defense's IR&D Policy Council has recognized
the need for development of uniform negotiation guidelines, criteria and
policies for negotiators. They have found that the factors considered
in determining reasonableness of IR&D and B&P costs included a four year
historical review and one to three year projections of the following data
submitted by each contractor [GAO Report B-167034, 1973, p. 23]:
IR&D costs Product line information
B&P costs Mix of contracts
Sales Burdening procedures
Allocation base data IR&D technical effort
Customer mix B&P technical information
Other information considered is as follows:
Departmental budgets
General business trends
Reliability of contractor estimates
Potential relationship of contractor program to DOD needs
Technical evaluation
Ceilings
The GAO reported that the use of these factors is basically subjective.
This circumstance increases the probability of inconsistencies in prac-
tice. It is important that methods be developed for consistent measure-
ment of these and other items so that uniform control of these costs can
become a reality.
The IR&D and B&P questionnaire provided insight into the desires
of industry and Government personnel. Responses were as follows:
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a. Statement: Government agencies should establish guidelines
that uniformly recognize, during IR&D and B&P ceiling negotiations, the
technical quality of contractors' IR&D programs with reward or penalty,
as appropriate. Response: 67 percent of industry and 78 percent of the
Government personnel agreed.
t>. Statement: Government IR&D administrative procedures
should include pre-negotiation arrangements, brochure requirements, and
the scope and nature of technical evaluations. Response: 77 percent of
both industry and Government personnel agreed.
c. Statement: Where there is a lack of normal competitive
restraints, IR&D must be subject to cost (but not technical control) to
preclude excessive charges to the Government. Response: 67 percent of
the contractors agreed and 72 percent of Government agreed.
d. Statement: A policy should be established by the Congress
stating the extent to which and under what circumstances Government agen-
cies should participate in the cost of contractors' IR&D and B&P efforts.
Response: 83 percent of industry did not agree while 61 percent of the
Government representatives agreed.
It is logical that negotiations for R&D work would necessarily
include evaluation of the technical content. The difficult task which
must be performed if any uniformity and consistency is to be obtained in
determining reasonableness is associated with the measurement methods
that must be determined and costs that must be included as a factor in
the negotiation process. Industry is not happy with the thought that the
Congress might provide the impetus for accomplishing these needs.
3. Contractor's Weighted Average Share of Cost Risk (CWAS)
The contractor's weighted average share of cost risk (CWAS) is
a technique for determining and expressing numerically the degree of cost
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risk (probability fo recovery) a contractor has assumed, based on an
analysis of the mix of types of contracts which he has agreed to perform
for his customers. This technique recognizes that all contractors do not
have the same financial risk in arriving at decisions regarding expendi-
tures of funds in meeting their contractual obligations. This concept
is based on the premise that good management by industry, properly moti-
vated to cost consciousness, can accomplish much more effective control
of costs than can detailed review, control and audits by Government per-
sonnel. It recognizes that a contractor who accepts higher risk con-
tracts has a greater financial motivation to exercise prudent business
judgment in the performance of such contracts. The specific objectives
of CWAS are as follows [ASPR Section 3-1002, 1973]:
(a) to furnish a measure of an individual contractor's risk motivation,
as provided by types of contracts, to conduct his business prudently and
with maximum economy;
(b) to offer additional inducement to a contractor to accept higher
risk type contracts;
(c) to minimize the extent of Government control, including controls
exercised through Department of Defense prime contracts and subcontracts
thereunder, thereby reducing Government costs;
(d) to provide a simple, uniform procedure for determining a con-
tractor's assumption of cost risk that can be applied equitably to all
defense contractors who desire to participate by voluntarily submitting
pertinent data;
(e) to provide a means for directing audit and other Department of
Defense management efforts to those areas where they are most needed
because of the greater degree of Government risk; and
(f) to provide a basis for determining that indirect costs incurred
during the applicable period by a contractor whose CWAS rating is above
a predetermined threshold are reasonable.
The CWAS technique is applicable to all contractors of the Depart-
ment of Defense on a voluntary basis. A contractor desiring to participate
in this program may do so by determining his own CWAS rating according to
the prescribed procedure. In order to establish an initial CWAS rating,
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the contractor must develop cost-incurred data at the close of his fiscal
year. These data must be based on his Government business, broken down
by types of contracts, and on his entire commercial business. Government
competitive firm-fixed-price contract costs may be combined with commer-
cial contract costs at the option of the contractor. The contractor must
submit similar data on an annual basis if he desires to retain his CWAS
rating.
The CWAS rating given to a contractor depends upon the riskiness
of his contracts. To understand the rating system more fully, one may
examine the limits of the spectrum. Under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract,
where full cost risk is assumed by the Government (assuming no unallowable
costs), the contractor is credited with zero cost risk. Under competitive
firm-fixed-price type contracts where the contractor has full cost risk,
he is credited with 100 percent of the cost risk. In between these limits
are a full range of risk associated contracts. The CWAS technique has a
system of values to be applied within various possible ranges of cost risk
4-
distribution, thus providing an easily computable cost risk rating. If
the profit center within which the cost was incurred has a CWAS rating
of 65 points or higher, 35 points or more of which rating were derived
I4.
The following is a simplified example of computing a CWAS rating:
Type of Contract Prior Year's Percentage Contractor's
Costs Incurred Factor Dollar Risk
Cost-plus-fixed-fee $ 300,000 $
Cost-plus-incentive-fee 500,000 15 75 t 000
Firm-fixed-price
(competitive) 200,000 100 200,000
Commercial 400,000 100 400,000
$1,400,000 $675,000
$675,000 H- $1,400,000 = 48.2 CWAS Rating.
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from competitive firm-fixed price contracts or commercial sales, the
reasonableness of the cost will not be questioned. However, if the pro-
fit center within which the cost was incurred has a CWAS rating of 50 or
higher but less than 65, the rating is given at the discretion of the
contracting officer [ASPR Section 3-1005, 1973].
The advantage to contractors using the CWAS technique is that,
by using it and having sufficient cost risk, the contractors may be ex-
cused from the determination of reasonableness of certain cost elements
for purposes of allowing reimbursement of those costs under cost type
contracts. They may also be excused from certain administrative type
contracts which would otherwise be applicable to their operations.
The cost principles in ASPR Section 15-205 carry an indicator of
either a "(CWAS)" or a "(CWAS-NA)." Those costs principles which are
subject to CWAS are preceded by the "(CWAS)" indicator; those principles
to which CWAS does not apply are preceded by the "(CWAS-NA)" indicator.
The cost principles for IR&D and B&P costs have been given indicators.
IR&D and B&P costs for which the historical formula is required carry the
"(CWAS)" indicator. The situations which use the advance agreement are
not applicable for the CWAS technique [ASPR Section 15-201.3, 1973].
The use of the CWAS technique appears to have definite advantages
for both the Government and the contractors. It tends to equalize treat-
ment between contractors, to constrain costs within the bounds of reason-
ableness, and to limit the involvement of Government in the internal af-
fairs of the contractors.
Industry objects to CWAS not being allowed for all contractors,
regardless of their size. They feel that costs of CWAS qualified and
approved contractors should automatically be determined reasonable,
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regardless of whether the advance agreement of the formula criterion
applies [CODSIA letter to ASPR Chairman, 26 June I968].
It is suggested, in reply to the industry position, that Govern-
ment officials responsible for public funds feel a need for close super-
vision of the large amount expended by contractors subject to advance
agreements. Hence, unlimited acceptance of costs expended for IR&D and
B&P by the contractors who attain the required CWAS threshold could re-
sult in a major drain of public funds.
C. RELEVANCE
There is great inconsistency in the Government's policy with regard
to IR&D costs. The Department of Defense had a policy for a number of
years that was very broad, in that allowed IR&D needed only to be related
to the mission of the Defense Department. Public Law 91-^f-l Section 203,
has required the DOD to determine the potential military i"elationship of
a function or operation before allowing funds to be used by the contrac-
tor. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) requires that a contractor's
project must be relevant to the contract then under consideration. The
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) has a policy of allowing
no IR&D as a separate item of contractor overhead; HEW s policy is to fund
fully projects of the contractor which are of interest to the department.
In contrast, the National Science Foundation, whose business is practi-
cally 100 percent R&D, places no restrictions on the IR&D programs of its
contractors.
A procurement policy which limits Government support of IR&D only to
that effort which is relevant to a Government mission or contract has
some influence on a company's management policies. Some companies, de-
siring Government support, are motivated to propose IR&D programs which
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will gain maximum acceptance by Government agencies. As those companies
perform IR&D over the years, their production potential becomes locked to
agency missions and they have less ability to move freely into the general
commercial market place. As Government missions change or programs de-
crease in dollar value, these companies may experience a number of prob-
lems in trying to convert their capabilities to commercial products.
Hence, the Government's relevancy policy can have a significant effect on
the ability of companies to move to other markets.
Industry believes that it is frequently very difficult to demonstrate
a relationship, direct or indirect, between the IR&D cost element in a
contract price and the product being bought. They point out that, while
there is some time lag in the recovery of B&P costs, it is nowhere near
as great as in the IR&D area; and there usually is a clearly identifiable
relationship between the B&P costs element in a given negotiation and the
product being purchased. On the other hand, they feel it is important to
remember that the source of IR&D funds received today — whether Govern-
ment or commercial — depends on the nature of the products researched
and developed years ago and sold today. That is to say, there is a con-
siderable lag between the receipt of funds for IR&D through the sale of
a current product and the ultimate sale of a future product developed
through the use of that current IR&D support. Therefore, it is rare that
there is any clearly identifiable relationship between the IR&D cost ele-
ment in a given negotiation and the product being purchased [Senate Armed
Services Committee Hearings, 1970, pp. 1801-031.
The GAO admits that matters of relevancy and benefits are somewhat
judgmental in nature. They can also see how it is difficult to define
with exactness the detailed functions and operations of a military organi-
zation. However, they do not see why appropriate criteria cannot be
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developed to provide the necessary guidance [Senate Armed Services
Committee Hearings, 1970, p. 1.919].
The IR&D and B&P questionnaire addressed the subject of relevancy and
the survey results are as follows:
a. 91 percent of the contractors and 71 percent of the Gov-
ernment personnel disagreed with the statement that reimbursement of IR&D
cost should be provided for under the terms of the contract only to the
extent that such independently sponsored R&D benefits the contract work,,
b. 81 percent of the contractors and 53 percent of the Gov-
ernment personnel disagreed with the statement that allowances to contrac-
tors for IR&D should be confined to projects that have a direct and appar-
ent relationship to a specific function of the Government agency.
c. 57 percent of the contractors and 88 percent of the Gov-
ernment personnel agreed that criteria for relevancy should be developed
for IR&D and B&P so that industry can take appropriate and consistent ac-
tion to satisfy the criteria of a test for potential military relationship.
The opinions of both the Government and contractor personnel tend to
be the same, even though in different degrees, for the subject of rele-
vancy. There is still considerable controversy in the area of relevancy,
and a concerted effort is needed to bring a resolution to the issue.
D. COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
The Congress established the Commission on Government Procurement
after conducting extensive hearings which disclosed that the economically
and politically important Government procurement process was overly com-
plex and ineffective in its practices. The Commission was created to
study and recommend to the Congress methods to promote the economy, ef-
ficiency, and effectiveness of procurement by the executive branch of the
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Federal Government. The Commission consisted of twelve members, who
represented the legislative and executive branches of Government as well
as the public. Thirteen study groups were organized to provide the Com-
mission with recommendations, backed up with a comprehensive set of rel-
evant and timely data. The study groups' efforts were used as working
tools by the Commission which, in turn, produced its report for the Con-
gress. The report of the Commssion on Government Procurement is a result
of this extensive study and contains 1^9 recommendations for improving
Government procurement [Procurement Commission Report, Vol. 1, 1972]].
The Procurement Commission recommendation which concerns IR&D and
B&P costs is complex and will not tend to bring great satisfaction to
either the Government or industry. The recommendation is as follows [jPro-
curement Commission Report, Vol. 2, 1972, pp. 31-32]:
Recognize in cost allowability principles that IR&D and B&P expenditures
are in the nation's best interests to promote competition (both domesti-
cally and internationally), to advance technology, and to foster economic
growth. Establish a policy recognizing IR&D and B&P efforts as necessary
costs of doing business and provide that:
(a) IR&D and B&P should receive uniform treatment, Government-wide with
exceptions treated by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy.
(b) Contractor cost centers with 50 percent or more fixed-price Govern-
ment contracts and sales of commercial products and services should have
IR&D and B&P accepted as an overhead item without question as to amount.
Reasonableness of costs for other contractors should be determined by
the present DOD formula with individual ceilings for IR&D and B&P nego-
tiated and trade-offs between the two accounts permitted.
(c) Contractor cost centers with more than 50 percent cost-type contracts
should be subject to a relevancy requirement of a potential relationship
to the agency function or operation in the opinion of the head of the
agency. No relevancy restriction should be applied to the other contrac-
tors.
Industry would find satisfaction that IR&D and B&P costs are recognized,
in the recommendation, as being necessary costs of doing business. The
expectation would be that industry is pleased by the proposal that Gov-
ernment accept, without question, the amount of those costs by companies
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whose business consisted of at least half commercial work and Government
fixed-price contracts. The IR&D and MP questionnaire results indicate
that 90 percent of the contractors agree with this part of the recommenda-
tion. However, 100 percent of the government respondents disagree with
the proposal, even though it is presumably designed to hold down these
overhead costs by encouraging more fixed-price contracts as well as caus-
ing them to be absorbed to a greater degree by the contractor's commercial
business.
Concerning the proposal that the reasonableness of costs for other
contractors be determined by the present DOD formula, with individual
ceilings for IR&D and B&P negotiated and with trade-offs between the two
accounts permitted, the questionnaire results show that $7 percent of the
contractors and 67 percent of the Government personnel agreed.
With regard to the recommendation that businesses having mainly cost-
type contracts be subject to a relevancy requirement, only 20 percent of
contractor respondents agreed, while 67 percent of the Government respon-
dents agreed. The recommendation that no relevancy restrictions should
be applied to other contractors was agreed to by 93 percent of the con-
tractors, but no Government personnel were satisfied with this proposal.
As indicated by the questionnaire results, great disagreement exists
regarding these costs and the Procurement Commission's proposals to regu-
late them. The fact that the Commission's proposals are a compromise is
indicated from an interview with one of the Commission's members, Commis-
sioner Richard E. Horner, president of the E.F. Johnson Company, who of-
fered this compromise position and who had pushed for removal of all Gov-




We were stuck. Elmer Staats (the Comptroller General) looked on IR&D as
a raid on the Treasury. He wouldn't budge. Finally, I got a majority
to go along with the relevancy restrictions on cost-plus contracts by
coupling it with the exemption for companies with heavy fixed-price busi-
ness.
The majority recommendation won by just one vote. Five commissioners
— Senator Chiles, Congressman Holifield, Congressman Horton, Comptroller
General Staats, and attorney James E. Webb — felt that the majority re-
commendation could encourage contractors to realign their organizations
in order to qualify for the exemption; this would lead to increased IR&D
costs. They further felt that the 50 percent rule for cost-type contracts
would complicate administration and be detrimental to small business be-
cause it would require them to meet a relevancy test to which they are
not now subject [Procurement Commission Report, Vol. 2, 1972, p. k0~\.
The five dissenting commissioners voted for a different recommenda-
tion, which was intended to retain the current Department of Defense pro-
cedure for IR&D and MP costs. They called for an agency-by-agency rele-
vancy requirement that would be determined by advance agreement with
contractors who received at least $2 million in IR&D and B&P payments in
the previous fiscal year. In all other cases, they felt that the present
DOD procedure of an historical formula for reasonableness should be con-
tinued. They added an additional provision to allow the Government suf-
ficient access to a contractor's records for its commercial business so
that the allowability of IR&D and B&P costs could be determined [Procure-
ment Commission Report, Vol. 2, 1972, p. 39^.
The IR&D and B&P questionnaire addressed the five dissenting commis-
sioners' proposals. The results are as follows:
a. Statement: It is important for agreement to be reached
between the Governmnet agency and its contractors in advance of the in-
currence of costs in categories where reasonableness or allocability are
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difficult to determine (such as IR&D) in order that possible subsequent
disallowances or disputes may be avoided. Response: 77 percent of the
contractors agreed; 100 percent of the Government personnel agreed.
b. Statement: The definition of reasonableness must vary
with individual cases. Below $2 million dollars spent annually for IR&D
by a contractor, reasonableness should be determined by application of
an historical formula or by the CWAS technique. Above this threshold
the Government should negotiate with the contractor in determining rea-
sonableness. Response: 56 percent of both contractor and Government
personnel agreed.
c. Statement: Allowable IR&D and B&P costs for companies
not required to negotiate advance agreements should be established by an
historical based formula, either on a companywide basis or by profit cen-
ters. Response: 43 percent of the contractors agreed and 5$ percent of
the Government personnel agreed.
d. Statement: A provision should be established whereby the
Government would have sufficient access to the contractor's records for
its commercial business to enable a determination that IR&D and B&P costs
are allowable. Response: 30 percent of the contractors agreed, while 78
percent of the Government personnel agreed.
The above results indicate that advance agreements are satisfactory
when the reasonableness of IR&D and B&P costs is nebulous. However, the
historical formula approach was not found to be extremely popular. The
dissenting commissioners included the proposal for access to the contrac-
tor's records for commercial business so as to insure that IR&D funds al-
lowed under Government contracts would not be used in direct support of
a contractor's commercial contracts or grants. The questionnaire indicates
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that Government personnel agree with the need while, as would be expected,
contractors generally have no desire for further inspection of their re-
cords .
A second dissenting position was offered to the Commission's majority
position "by Commissioner Frank Sanders, Undersecretary of the Navy, be-
cause he felt that the majority and the first dissenting positions were
more short-term in scope and might not offer potential long-range solu-
tions to the problems inherent in the IR&D and MP process. Commissioner
Arthur F. Sampson, acting administrator of the General Services Admini-
stration, voted for the majority position but recommended exploration of
Mr, Sanders' alternatives. Commissioner Sanders proposed that several
different approaches be undertaken to explore the best ways to reach a
full solution for these costs. These potential solutions include the fol-
lowing [^Procurement Commission Report, Vol. 2, 1972, pp. 40-^-2]:
a. Periodic agency announcements of areas in wliich contractor
research efforts are particularly desired and the percentage of costs that
the Government would pay,
b. Use of combinations of grants, guaranteed loans and
interest- or non-interest bearing loans for research,
c. A system of national R&D awards funneled through various
professional societies as grants to specific individuals in recognition
of efforts to advance technology,
d. An approach whereby the Government would make direct re-
search grants which contractors would account for separately and use for
their own research programs subject to periodic disclosure (Commissioner
Sanders described this as a "non-profit cost center" approach)
,
e. A tax credit device for offsetting one year's allowed ex-
penditure against the current or subsequent year's tax, and
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f. A return on investment approach for negotiation of overall
profit.
The IR&D and B&P questionnaire examined the opinions of persons in
industry and Government on three of Commissioner Sanders' alternatives.
The response indicated that 83 percent of the contractors and 6l percent
of Government personnel did not agree with the non-profit cost center ap-
proach. With regard to using a tax credit device, 76 percent of the busi-
ness representatives and 56 percent of the representatives from Government
did not agree with that alternative. For the return on investment ap-
proach, 87 percent of industry were against the proposal and 56 percent
of the Government respondents likewise were not in favor. Hence, industry
appears not to want any method of allowance other than considering these
costs as an overhead item; Government personnel, as well, appear not to
"be receptive to use of new methods. The resistance to change may be partly
explained as a natural psychological characteristic.
Neither advocates for industry nor advocates for a tougher Government
position against contractors appear to have received from the Procurement
Commission the objectives that they desired. Industry wanted less Gov-
ernment control of IR&D and B&P costs but got more in the form of a rele-
vancy test for all agencies. Hard-line Government advocates wanted
tighter controls but got a proposed exemption for contractors that have
more commercial and Government fixed-price work than cost-plus type con-
tracts. Senator Proxmire's evaluation of the Commission's IR&D and B&P
recommendation is as follows [National Journal, 23 June 1973 » p. 900]:
The IR&D proposal is irresponsible, extravagant and wasteful. Whatever
contractor would get away with without a scandal, they'd be inclined to




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
How should the Government of the United States plan for the future
so as to provide for the "best possible general welfare of its people and
of this "only one earth"? Consider the following statement by Adam Smith
[The Wealth of Nations, ' 1776]:
Every individual endeavors to employ his capital so that its produce may
be of greatest value. He generally neither intends to promote the public
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. He intends only his own
security, only his own gain. And he is in this led by an invisible hand
to promote an end which was no part of his intention. By pursuing his
own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it.
Sometimes the private efforts that Adam Smith talked about will not
or cannot go far enough. Opportunities to raise productivity that are
highly profitable from a social point of view will not be seized when they
offer too little from a private point of view. The benefits from research
in basic science or in technology may not be fully enjoyed by the indi-
viduals or companies making the effort and bearing the costs. There may,
then, be less investment in research and development than what social con-
cerns might suggest there "ought" to be. Or social arrangements that may
have had merit in the past may now be dulling private incentives to raise
productivity.
Sometimes private efforts may go too far. Advantageous though they
might be to the individual or firm, they could be adding little or nothing
to, or even tedning to reduce, the nation's productivity. On the other
hand, an industry may cut its own costs and raise its own productivity but
do so by using technologies that pollute rivers and tend to reduce the
productivity of communities downstream.
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When the pursuit of private interests falls short or goes too far, in
terms of a social (rather than private) judgment of the results, the Gov-
ernment's responsibility is clear and it must take action. It can support,
or support more strongly, private activities that yield greater social than
private rates of return. It can reduce or eliminate its support of pri-
vate activities that yield smaller social than private rates of return or
even restrain such activities when this appears necessary.
When stated in these general terms, many would agree on the desirabil-
ity and the general nature of governmen+^1 policies. But it is easier to
agree on general principles than on specific applications. If it is to
be useful, a program must specify just what should be done, how to do it,
what cost is likely to be incurred, and what returns may be expected.
Conclusions and recommendations for the allowability and allocability
of IR&D and B&P costs are presented and discussed in the remainder of this
chapter.
1. A broad technology base for the United States can greatly
contribute to the national security, the improvement of health, the spread
of leisure, and the general, enrichment of life for the citizens. The in-
herent abilities of a profit-oriented economy to initiate, diffuse, and
adjust to technical change are a great asset to this well-being.
The first chapter of this thesis stressed the need to plan,
in the short- and long-term, for research and development in order to al-
locate resources efficiently for a given technology and to advance tech-
nology. Many of the nation's urgent problems — such as an unfavorable
international balance of trade, population growth with its corollary
problems of energy, pollution, housing and transportation, and the need
for adequate national security — can find timely solutions if adequate
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encouragement is provided by the nation's leaders for a broad and solid
industrial technology base.
The area of IR&D and B&P costs is characterized by differences
of opinion. In part, disagreement arises because opinions differ on what
would be most effective. It is possible that interested parties simply
lack the full perspective that would point clearly to the best among sev-
eral possible policies. The differences of opinion on IR&D and B&P costs
also arise because of different public and private objectives. These
various objectives are perceived and valued differently by different cit-
izens. These differences are important because virtually everything the
Government does, or could do, tends to further some objectives more than
others. Therefore, the differences of opinion on this subject will, to
a large extent, be resolved in the political arena. In this arena, fun-
damental realities need to be recognized.
The nation's decision-makers need to plan effectively for the
future, choosing the best solutions from all of the alternatives that are
available. The Government needs to manage by objectives. It needs to
determine clearly the objectives of IR&D and B&P efforts and then needs
to discover effective methods of measuring attempts to attain the objec-
tives.
The Government has an objective of stimulating innovation.
However, there is an additional objective of spending the general pub-
lic's funds in an efficient and effective manner. The Government's lead-
ers are concerned, because of past wasteful experiences, that unconstrain-
ed research and development effort may not meet both objectives. Industry
is concerned that too much governmental control causes IR&D to lose its
independence and, therefore, the ability to attain maximum innovation.
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Both objectives need to be met, but one should not be met to the detriment
of the other.
The Congress, with its inherent power to authorize programs
and appropriate the public's funds, needs to provide more definitive IR&D
and B&P policy guidance, wherein focus is given to national objectives,
such as the objectives of stimulating innovation as well as to the objec-
tive of conscientious thrift. A concerted effort should be made by the
Congress to communicate a harmonious balance of these objectives. The
highest level of the executive brancn — the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB)j for example — then needs to amplify and communicate the
intent of the Congress so that each agency may determine its own objec-
tives. These agency objectives, periodically updated to reflect changing
needs and conditions, should be integrated by OMB so that the national
objectives, as a whole, are known and available for use by Government and
contractor personnel involved with IR&D and B&P efforts.
RECOMMENDATION : The Congress should determine what national objectives
are in regard to IR&D and B&P projects. These objectives should then be
communicated to the executive branch, which in turn should communicate
by executive order or OMB circular policy and guidance to appropriate
agencies of Government.
2. Industry takes the position that IR&D is a necessary part of
keeping itself in business and that there is a need for a truly indepen-
dent R&D effort. To be truly independent, industry believes that there
should be no relevancy requirement associated with IR&D. On the other
hand, the Government position reflected in present regulations permit,
direct, or leave open to an agency's discretion the application of the
rule of relevancy. The relevancy rule most applied to determine
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allowability of an IR&D project, as indicated in chapter IV of this thesis,
is one which requires relevance to a function or mission or to a contract
requirement.
It seems logical that there should be a uniform, Government-
wide policy with respect to the relevance of IR&D costs. The present pol-
icy appears to be causing too much of an adversary relationship between
the two participants and undue disunity of effort. The adversary rela-
tionship is regretable. Government and industry both have the same ob-
jectives — to encourage innovation, broaden the technological base, and
increase productivity growth. However, in efforts to achieve these goals,
personnel on each side of the relevancy issue become overly aggressive as
partisans of their cause and thus lose sight of the common goals.
The relevancy test should consider the objectives of the Gov-
ernment as a whole ajid not the potentially parochial goals of the indi-
vidual agencies or of industry. However, success in eliminating the
adversary relationship will be possible only if the objectives are known
and applied by all cognizant personnel.
RECOMMENDATION : Congress should initiate a uniform relevancy policy that
requires IR&D projects to be relevant to specified national objectives.
3. IR&D and B&P costs have traditionally been allowed by DOD as
a necessary business expense and have been treated as an indirect cost
item, an element of a company's overhead. To replace these efforts with
direct contract support would reduce the independent, original and crea-
tive thinking of contractors and would narrow the support base available
to the Government, Direct contracting would also cause the Government
to incur a significant administrative burden. To treat IR&D as a profit
factor does not appear viable because it could not be practically
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administered and applied. The amount of profit would continually be
subject to controversy.
RECOMMENDATION: Government contracting policies should continue to recog-
nize IR&D and MP costs as overhead charges of industry and a normal cost
of being in business.
k. The dual determination of reasonableness used by the Depart-
ment of Defense is practical, satisfies Government's concern for adequate
control and, at the same time, preserves the necessary independent nature
of IR&D work. Use of negotiated advance agreements with the relatively
few large defense contractors limits the amount of administrative re-
sources required for technical and cost evaluation and control. The De-
fense Department's historically based formula used for the large number
of smaller companies who recover IR&D and B&P costs is workable and can
be uniformly applied. This method, as described in chapter IV, offers
results that can be easily monitored with less administrative effort than
is necessary for advance agreements. The formula method can also be eas-
ily adjusted, if necessary. Using actual sales or costs as a basis for
the formula is practical and reasonable.
There is a need for advance agreements to be negotiated prior
to the incurrence of cost. It appears reasonable that multi-year advance
agreements could be accomplished with firms that are known to use sound
business practices in order to aid in effecting timeliness of the agree-
ments. Knowledge of companies with sound business practices should be
available from analyses of successfully completed Government contracts.
RECOMMENDATION : The Government should continue to determine the reason-
ableness of IR&D and B&P costs by means of advance agreements with large
contractors and by use of an historically based formula for smaller
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contractors. Use of multi-year advance agreements with companies who have
demonstrated sound business practices should be explored.
5. Cost ceilings determine the total amount of costs that the
Government will recognize. These limitations are necessary because the
Government must maintain some degree of control over the public's funds
that are used for non-competitive procurement. It is recognized that the
contractor may spend additional IR&D and B&P funds out of his profits when
his company objectives dictate such action. The policy of not sharing
the costs within the ceiling is fair because they should be considered as
overhead costs of a firm. Allowing transfer of costs from IR&D to B&P
and vice versa is practical because of the difficulty of distinguishing
between the two categories.
RECOMMENDATION: Government procurement contracts should continue use of
separate dollar ceilings for IR&D and B&P costs without any requirement
to share costs within the ceilings and allow transfer of funds between
the two without exceeding the combined total ceiling.
6. In consideration of all the evidence that has been presented
on the subject of allocability of IR&D and B&P costs in chapter III 1 a
cost accounting standard (or possibly more than one) for these costs is
needed. The number of alternate methods of reporting these costs is too
great and must be reduced. It is important that IR&D and B&P costs have
more comparability, reliability, and consistency. However, before effec-
tive standards for these costs can come about, it appears that preceding
standards are required. For example, standards covering (i) segment gen-
eral and administrative expenses, (ii) allocation of burden, and (iii)
direct and indirect charging may all provide guidance that will clarify,
to a large extent, controversial areas of IR&D and B&P costs and will act
as a foundation on which to build meaningful and effective standards.
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What should a cost accounting standard for IR&D and B&P costs
contain? First, the definitions of research and development should be
clarified so that accounting for them will he accurate. If possible, the
accounting definitions should be the sane as technical definitions. If
not possible, differences between the definitions should be clearly un-
derstood.
Second, determination of the composition of IR&D and MP cost
pools should be consistent and uniform. The alternative accounting meth-
ods for accomplishing overhead absorption for these costs need to be re-
duced. The method of including direct and allocable indirect costs but
not G&A expenses appears to be satisfactory and should be considered a
practical solution to the problem of composition.
Third, alternate methods of allocating IR&D and B&P costs to
final cost objectives need to be more limited. It is often difficult to
relate these costs to a specific end object. Nevertheless, a standard
should address desirable alternate methods of allocation and provide a
hierarchical ranking of them.
Fourth, their needs to be a hierarchy of bases for allocation
that addresses the best ways to distribute IR&D and B&P costs according
to responsibility assumed and benefits received by the several benefi-
ciaries. Because it is difficult to determine who receives the benefits,
the allocation base can very easily be selected arbitrarily. Hence, us-
ing the same basis that is used for allocating G&A expense seems reason-
able and should rank high in any cost accounting standard's hierarchy of
bases.
Fifth, IR&D and B&P cost accounting standards should provide
direction as to when these costs can be capitalized and then amortized
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over future periods. Generally i IR&D and B&P costs should not be capitalized,
"because it is very difficult to establish the amortization period for which
the possible benefits may accrue and the uncertainty of research work does
not provide a firm basis for capitalization. IR&D and B&P costs should be
deferred only if they meet specific criteria, similar to those mentioned
in the AICPA study [Ref. 19].
RECOMMENDATION ; The Cost Accounting Standards Board should develop cost
accounting standards for IR&D and B&P costs that will identify and limit
alternatives and resolve the issue.-? of
a. the proper classification and accumulation of IR&D and B&P
costs,
b. allowable methods of allocation to the various cost objec-
tives in a hierarchical ranking,
c. the bases to be used for distribution, and
d. deferral of costs to a future period or immediate recogni-
tion.
The requirement that IR&D and B&P cost pools be composed of
direct and all allocable indirect costs, but not general and administra-
tive expenses, should be continued pending development of a cost accounting
standard in this area. Also, the general requirement to allocate IR&D and
B&P costs on the same basis as general and administrative expenses should
be used until a cost accounting standard in this area can be promulgated.
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APPENDIX A. IR&D AND B&P QUESTIONNAIRE
The IR&D and B&P questionnaire was organized so that addressees could
indicate their opinions on fifty separate statements related to IR&D and
B&P costs. To help ensure a reasonable degree of comparability in the re-
sponses to the questionnaire, definitions of significant terms were pro-
vided. It was realized that many of the opinions could be expressed with
a simple yes or no answer. A wider range of answers was provided for those
who wanted to indicate a degree of uncertainty. Those choices were the
following:
1. No / Strongly disagree.
2. Disagree. You disagree more than you agree.
3. No opinion.
k. Agree. You agree more than you disagree.
5. Yes / Strongly agree.
In addition, on three of the statements recipients were asked to select
their preference among different alternatives or to specify other alter-
natives.
On the following pages, the statements of the questionnaire are pre-
sented. Following each statement is a statistical matrix presentation of
the response results. The various responses that could have been chosen
are indicated across the top of the matrix at the head of each column.
The left-hand side of the matrix, the row headings, indicates the two cat-
egories of respondents. Contractors are represented by the symbol KR 50
and Government personnel, by the symbol NOT KR 60. Each cell of the ma-
trix presents the following data, reading from top to bottom: (i) the
number of respondents in the particular category (i.e., contractors or
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Government personnel) who chose that answer (COUNT), (ii) the percentage
of respondents in the particular category who selected that answer (ROW
PCT), (iii) the percentage of respondents in the category who chose an
answer out of the total of all respondents in both categories who picked
that answer (COL PCT), and (iv) the percentage of those in a category who
selected an answer out of the total number of respondents in both cate-
gories (TOT PCT).
Various statistical coefficients are provided for each statement's
response. Details concerning interpretation of these data can be obtained
by referring to reference 51 (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences).
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IR&D AND B&P QUESTIONNAIRE DEFINITIONS
1. INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (IR&D) : A contractor's independent
research and development (IR&D) is that technical effort which is not spon-
sored by, or required in performance of, a contract or grant and which con-
sists of projects falling in three areas: (l) basic and applied research,
(2) development, and (3) systems and other concept formulation studies.
2. BID AND PROPOSAL COSTS (B&P) : Bid and Proposal (B&P) costs are the
costs incurred in preparing, submitting, and supporting bids and proposals
(whether or not solicited) on potential Government or non-Government con-
tracts.
3. UNIFORMITY: Uniformity relates to comparison of two or more account-
ing entities. It is achieved when contractors with the same circumstances
(with respect to a given subject) follow the practice appropriate for those
circumstances.
4. COST OBJECTIVE: Cost Objective is a function, organizational subdivi-
sion, contract or other work unit for which cost data are desired and for
which provision is made to accumulate and measure the costs of processes,
products, jobs, capitalized projects, etc.
5. ALLOCABILITY: Allocability is an accounting concept affecting the as-
certainment of contract cost; it results from a relationship between a cost
and a cost objective such that the cost objective appropriately bears all
or a portion of the cost. To be charged with all or part of a cost, a cost
objective should cause or be an intended beneficiary of the cost.
6. ALLOWABILITY: Allowability is a procurement concept affecting contract
price and in most cases is expressly provided in regulatory or contractual
provisions. A contracting agency may include in contract terms or in its
procurement regulations a provision that it will refuse to allow certain
costs, incurred by contractors, that are unreasonable in amount or con-
trary to public policy.
7. DIRECT COST: Direct cost is any cost which is identified specifically
with a particular final cost objective. Direct costs are not limited to
items which are incorporated in the end product as material or labor.
Costs identified specifically with a contract are direct costs of that
contract. All costs identified specifically with other final cost objec-
tives of the contractor are direct costs of those cost objectives.
8. INDIRECT COST: Indirect cost is any cost not directly identified with
a single final cost objective, but identified with two or more final cost
objectives or with at least one intermediate cost objective.
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1. Cost allowability principles should recognize that TR*/D and fcft?
expenditures are in the nation's best interest to nromote competition
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2. A contractor's performance of IR£D generally results in reduced
costs to the Government because of exploratory work completed before





































































CHI SQUARE - 20.57061 WITH
CRA^bF « <; V = 0.65384
CONT INCF'lC Y CP C FFIFIFMT =
KFNOALL'S TAI) H - -0.5649?
KFNOALL'S .TAU C = -0.64593
GA^A = -0.R2301
SO^FP «S P = -0.46 3 76















3. DOi) policy on IRftD and B&P costs encourage companies to conduct
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5. It would be highly desirable for all government agencies to adopt
uniform policies and procedures regarding IPAD and B&P costs so as to
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6. There is a need for explicit guidance on conrposition of IR&D and
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7. It is practicable to make a preponderant identification of IR&D
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8. Reimbursement of IRAO cost should be provided for under the terns
of the contract to the extent that such independently sponsored R&D
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9. Allowances to contractors for 7R&D should be confined to projects
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10. B&P costs should not be included within the purview of control
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12. Within a ceiling limitation determined by an advance agreement
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13. Provision should be made permitting the contractor to increase
recovery of costs for either IMD or B^P above the individually nego-
tiated ceilings, orovided that recovery of costs for the other is
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Hi. Government agencies should establish guidelines that uniformly
recopnizn, during IR&D and B&P ceilin? negotiations, the technical
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1$. Presently there qre sufficient guidelines for excluding TR*/D




v a p o 1
5
CnUNT
ROW PCT STRONGLY Dl SAGF.EF MO OP IN I AGREF STRONGLY *ISS ING
col pct [ D T S A op t- ON Aj"FF VALUES
THT PCT 1 . t 2. t 3. [ 4. [ 5. 6.
50. [ 2 [ 2 ?, 16 2
! 6.7 0.0 6.7 26.7 [ ^3.3 [ 6.7
I 4 0.O [ 0.0 1 3 3.3 72.7 94. 1 [ 100.0
[ 4.? [ 0.0 [ 4. ? 16. 7 ] 33. 3 4.2
60. [ ^ [ 7 ] 4 5 1 1 [
I 16.7 1 38.9 -> -> t 16.7 5.6 [ 0.060.0 100. 6 6. 7 2 7.3 ^ .4 0.0
_







I Ti|CHI SQUA r-'F = 23.86630
CRAMER'S V = 0.70513
CONTINGENCY C nFFFICIFNT =
KFNDAll'S TA'J H = -0.56833
KFNFIALL'S TAU C = -0.6840 3
GAMMA = -0.8107
SOM.PR 'S P = -9.4427J













16. TR^D overruns should be included in indirect costs for Tllocqtion
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17. The costs of preparing both successful and unsuccessful bids and
proposals should be allowable if their subject matter is applicable
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18. As a general rule. IH&Ti and B&P costs should be allocated to con-
tracts on the same basis as the general and administrative 'GA-O expense
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19. It is desirable for the Government to establish a hierarchy of
allocation methods for the selection of an appropriite allocation base,
based on achieving the most realistic representation of the beneficial
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?0. A Cost Accountants Standard on TR*-U and B'V costs:






ROW PCT I STRONGLY DISAGREE
COL PCT I DISAOPF






























































CHI SQUAPF = 17.1 r>55 5 WITH
CAMFP • S V = C. 59784
rn,\jT INGFNCY CnFEFICIC'T ^ 0.51313
KENDALL'S T/MJ '1 = -0.^1462
KFN0AL1 "S TAU C = -0.5S903
OAKMA = -0.781^5
SOMFP 'S D = -0.44414




















?1, A Cost Accounting Stand <rd on Tft'-D ind B' p costs:
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5 DEGREES OF FREEDOM
Ik?

22. A Cost Accounting Standard should require that each contractor
establish and adhere to a reasonable IR&D and hbo? cost policy rather
than a uniform policy.
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5 DEGREES OF c RFE00M
23- The detail and depth of cost accounting treatment required of a
contractor as backup supoort for proposals, billings, or claims, should
be the minimum necessary to establish and maintain visibility as to:
(l) The amount and nature of the costs which have been identified
as IR&U and B&P.
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2h. IR&D and B&P costs should be handled as independent issues when









































































CHI SQUARE = 1.66457 WITH
CRAMFP'^ V = 0.18622
CONTINGENCY COtFMCIFNT =
KENDALL'S TAU P = -0.13131
KFNDALL'S TAU C = -0.1475 7
GAMMA = -0.2316 1
SOMER'S D = -0.109 54












25. A Cost Accounting Standard for IRAO and bbP should address the
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27. The contractor's benefits of having a TRW and B&.P Cost Accounting
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28 The basis for relevancy should be developed for IFftD and BW so
that industry can tike appropriate and consistent action to satisfy
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?9. Government IR&-D administrative procedures should include pre-
nep;otiation arrangements . brochure requirements, and the scope and
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30. Where there is a lack of normal coirioetitive restraints. IR'.-D must
be subject to cost control (hut not technical control) to ureclua>
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3?. It is important for agreement to be reached between the Government
agency and its contractors in advance of the incurrence of costs in
categories where reasonableness or allocability sre difficult to deter-
mine (such as IR.W in order that possible subsequent disallowances or
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33. (a) IK&D and BAP costs should be accepted by Government as an over-
head item without question as to amount for contractor cost centers with
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3U . ( b ) Reasonableness of costs for other contractors should be deter-
mined by the present DOD formula with individual ceilings for IR&D and
B&P negotiated and trade-offs between the two accounts permitted.
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35. (a) Cost centers with more than 50$ cost-type contracts should be
subject to a relevancy requirement of a potential relationship to the
agency function or operation in the opinion of the head of the agency,
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37 . Allowable Tk&D and B&P c^st.s for companies not required to nego-
tiate Advance Agreements should be established by a historic ally based
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3o. If Ih&D allowances to Government contractor? are not related
directly to current or prospective Government procurement, financial
support should also be provided to comranies with similar capabilities
which do not hold Government contracts as a means of supporting and
strengthening industrial technology.
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39. A systematic method of disseminating information on TR4D pro.iects
that are in process is needed in order to help prevent unnecessary
dunlication on Government sponsored research.
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UO. A nrovision should be established -ho'-ebv the Oover-runer.* would
have sufficient access to the cor',--ctnr's records for its eonr-Tcial
busines? to enable a determination th-t- "R'-n -,nd b,p costs are allowable.
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Ul. As an alternative to any allocation to contracts, the Government
should subsidize TPAD and b&P costs. A non-profit cost center aonroach
should be taken wherein contractors who desire to so participate, set uo
designated "non-profit" cost centers whereby the Government would ?rant
a certain amount of nor.ey. The amount could be based on a cert-in o^rcent-
ap;e of the company's business, or it could simply be an arbitrary amount
The contractor in turn would credit such funds to a non-profit cor.t center
and would be free to use the funds to finance any effort as long as public
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k2. Total abandonment should be made of the current IR&D and b-tP mech-
anism as it is now managed. A shift should be made to:
(a) A tax credit device for offsetting one year's allowed expend-
iture apainst the current or subsequent year's tax (similar to present
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li3. (b) The fee or profit on a contract should bo based in part on
Return on Investment and capitalized IhfcD and B&P costs should be
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lib. The definition of reasonableness mu^t vary with individual cases.
Below 8? million dollars spent annually for IR&D by a contractor,
reasonableness should be determined by application c r a historical
formula or by the CWA.'J technique. Above this threshold the Government
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h5. There are possible inor!ui ti°«! to the Govpmiient when contractors
develop products under TRrn prn?rTis in d^fpfseA^ace co°t centers ind
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A <n'pnif i cart portion of contractors' patents result from inventions
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U7 For any TR&D r^oiect. which thfi wovernjpnn +. <;unoorts fully or on a
cost-sharinr basis, the Governing"* should be entitled to information
and royalty- f,-ee rieht-5 to any Invention arisinc therefrom.
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Direct costs and O^A costs.
Direct costs, and =11 allocable indirect costs, evcer.t GM
costs should not. be considered allocable
Direct costs, allocnble indirect cor.ts ind ' 1AA costs
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Ij9. The most effective and practical technique for determining
reasonableness of TR&D is: (check one N
(1) Technical evaluation
(2) Industry norms by industry group
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S'O. Concerning alternate ways of allocating or recovering IftoD and
B&p costs, the most favored allocation is by: 'check one 1
111 Continuation of recovery through overhead allocation.
I?} Recovery via a direct contract or grant.
(3) Recovery through Drofit.
(Ji ^ Other fsnecify^.
V A D c
cruwT i
= 0W PC" I •' I?- SI NO r
CP1 pr T 1 VALUE S





















































































Krr;(\M I • S
G 5 f v A =





















1. Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc., "White Paper" on
Independent Research and Development , 19 May 1969.
2. Allison, David, The R&D Game , Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Press, 1969.
3. Anthony, R.N., "What Should 'Cost' Mean?", Harvard Business Review ,
v. 48 no. 3, p. 121-131, May 1970.
4. Appeal of Technical Communications Corporation, ASBCA No. AS-11931,
67-2 BCA, August 1967.
5. Brown, Lester E. , "An Overview of World Trends," The Futurist , p.
225-235. December 1972.
6. Bulloch, James, Defense Contract Costing; The State of the Art , Na-
tional Association of Accountants Research Study, 1972.
7. Casey, W.J., "Toward Common Accounting Standards," speech delivered
before the Conference on Financial Reporting, Paris, France, 19 May
1972, The Journal of Accountancy , v. 134 no. 4, p. 70-73, October
1972.
8. Commission on Government Procurement Report , General Procurement
Considerations, Volume 1, 31 December 1972.
9. Commission on Government Procurement Report , Acquisition of Research
and Development, Volume 2, 31 December 1972.
10. Cost Accounting Standards Guide , Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1972.
11. Cost Accounting Standards Board Disclosure Statement , Form CASB-DS-1,
Public Law 91-379, Subchapter E, Part 351.14, 1970.
12. Cost Accounting Standards Board, Progress Report to the Congress
,
August 1972.
13. Contract Administration , v. 1 revised edition, The Ohio State Univer-
sity College of Administrative Science, Continuing Education Divi-
sion, September 1971.
14. Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations letter to Colonel
Reagan A. Scurlock, Chairman, Armed Services Procurement Regulation
Committee, 25 April 1968.
15. Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations letter to Colonel
Reagan A. Scurlock, Chairman, Armed Services Procurement Regulation
Committee, 26 June 1968.
16. Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations letter to Charles




17. Dana, C.A. , "Cost Accounting Standards - Phase II," National Contract
Management Association News Letter Anthology , v. 2, p. 90-93* Jan-
uary 1973.
18. Danhof, C.H. , Government Contracting and Technological Change , The
Brookings Institution, 1968.
19. Department of Defense, Armed Services Procurement Regulation , Section
XV, Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1949, 1959 1 and
1973 editions.
20. Department of Defense Instruction 4105.52 , "Uniform Negotiation for
Reimbursement of Independent Research and Development Costs," 28
June i960.
21. Department of Defense Instruction 5100.66 , "Establishment of Policy
for, and Technical Evaluation of, Independent Research and Develop-
ment Program," 29 February 1972.
22. Department of Defense, Defense Procurement Circular No. 90 1 1 Sep-
tember 1971.
23. Federal Register , Cost Accounting Standard - Allocation of Home Of-
fice Expenses to Segments, v. 37 no. 241, 14 December 1972.
24. Federal Register , Cost Accounting Standard - Capitalization of Tangi-
ble Assets, v. 38 no. 38, 27 February 1973.
25. Federal Register , Cost Accounting Standard - Accounting for Unallow-
able Costs, v. 38 no. 172, 6 September 1973.
26. Frejka, Thomas, "The Prospects for a Stationary World Population,"
Scientific American
, v. 228 no. 3» p. 21, March 1973.
27. Fubini, E.G. (Department of Defense), letter to E.B. Staats (Bureau
of the Budget) , 23 November 1964.
28. Gee, R.E. , "A Survey of Current Project Selection Practices," Re-
search Management
,
v. 14 no. 5» p. 40, September 1971.
29. Gellein, O.S. , and Newman, M.S., Accounting for Research and Develop-
ment Expenditures
,
Accounting Research Study 14, American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Inc. , 1973
•
30. General Accounting Office Report B-I33386, Review of Costs of Bidding
and Related Technical Efforts Charged to Government Contracts , March
1967.
31. General Accounting Office Report on the Feasibility of Applying Uni-
form Cost Accounting Standards to Negotiated Defense Contracts
,
January 1970.
32. General Accounting Office Report B-164912, Allowances for Independent
Research and Development Costs in Negotiated Contracts - Issues and
Alternatives
, l6 February 1970.
165

33. General Accounting Office Report B-167034, Payments for Independent
Research and Development and Bid and Proposal Costs, 16 April 1973
•
34. Harris, G.L., The American Economy , Irwin, 1956.
35. Hershey, R.L., "Finance and Productivity in Industrial Research and
Development," speech delivered at Middle Atlantic Regional Meeting
of the American Chemical Society, 4 February 1966.
36. Hitch, C.J., Decision Making for Defense , University of California
Press, 1965.
37. Kendrick, J.W. , Productivity Trends in the United States , Princeton
University Press, 1961.
38. Komzin, "The Economic Impact of Scientific and Technological Progress,"
The Role of Science and Technology in Economic Development, Science
Policy Studies and Documents No. 18, United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization , Paris, France, 1970.
39. Lawson, J.S. , Jr., Director of Navy Laboratories, Department of the
Navy, personal interview, 14 June 1973*
40. Logistics Management Institute, Report on Contractor Independent
Technical Effort (CITE) Reimbursement Policies , August I966.





42. Mansfield, Edwin, Industrial Research and Technological Innovation
,
W.W. Norton, I968.
43. McNamara, R.S., speech delivered to the Board of Directors of the
World Bank, 25 September 1972.
44. Minasian, The Economics of Research and Development in the Rate of
Direction of Incentive Activity; Economic and Social Factors , Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton University Press,
1968.
45. National Association of Accountants Research Report 29 » Accounting
for Research and Development Costs
,
June 1955.
46. National Science Foundation Report 72-309 » Research and Development
in Industry, 1970 » Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office,
1972.
47. National Science Foundation Report 72-317. Federal Funds for Research
and Development and Other Scientific Activities, Fiscal Years 1971
>
1972, and 1973 . Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1972.
48. Naval Material Command Report P-4100, Survey of Procurement Statistics ,
Department of the Navy, June 1972.
166

49. Nelson, R.R. , Peck, M.J., and Kalachek, E.B. , Technology, Economic
Grov.'th and Public Policy , The Brookings Institution, I967.
50. Newman, M.S., "Equating Return from R&D Expenditures," Financial
Executive
,
v. 36 no. 4, p. 26-33 > April I968.
51 • Nie, Norman, Bent, D.H., and Hull, G.H. , Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) , McGraw-Hill, 1970.
52. Phillips, J.G., "Economic Report / Procurement Commission Proposals
Could Affect Thousands of Companies," National Journal , v. 5 no. 25
»
p. 897-907, 23 June 1973.
53. Raines, The Impact of Applied Research and Development on Productiv-
ity , Working Paper no. 6814, Washington University Department of
Economics, September I968.
54. Rickover, H.G. , "Accounting Practices - Do They Protect the Public?",
speech delivered to the Federal Government Accountants Association
National Symposium, 18 June 1970.
55. Rickover, H.G. , "Problems in Defense Procurement," statement before
the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 28 April 1971.
56. Scherer, F.M., The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives ,
Harvard University, 1964.
57. Schoenhaut, Arthur, letter to the National Contract Management Asso-
ciation, list of subjects for possible development and formulation
of cost accounting standards, National Contract Management Asso-
ciation News Letter
,
v. 13 no. 9» p. 3» July 1973.
58. Staats, E.B. , "Uniform Cost Accounting Standards in Negotiated De-
fense Contracts," Management Accounting
,
v. 50 no. 5» p. 21-25i
January I969.
59. Stans, Maurice, Statement to Subcommittee on Science, Research, and
Development, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 92nd
Congress, 1st Session, 27 July 1971.
60. Statutes at Large, Volume 1, p. 419 > Purveyor of Public Supplies Act ,
1795.
61. Statutes at Large, Volume 12, p. 220, Civil Sundry Appropriations
Act
, 1861.
62. Statutes at Large, Volume 48, p. 503, Vinson - Trammel Act , 1934.
63. Statutes at Large, Volume 49, p. 1985, Merchant Marine Act of 1936 ,
1936.




65. Statutes at Large, Volume 54, P« 974, Second. Revenue Act of 1940 ,
19*K).
66. Statutes at Large, Volume 62, p. 21, Armed Services Procurement Act
of 1947 , 1947.
67. Statutes at Large, Volume 63, p. 578, National Security Act of 1947,
as Amended in 1949 1 1949.
68. Statutes at Large, Volume 82, p. 279 » Defense Production Act of 1950
»
as Amended by Public Law 90-370; Section 718 , 1968.
69. Statutes at Large, Volume 83 > p. 204, Military Procurement Authoriza-
tion Act of 1970, Public Law 91-121 , I969.
70. Statutes at Large, Volume 84, p. 796, Defense Production Act of 1^50
1
as Amended by Public Law 91-379 1 Section 719 1 1970.
71. Statutes at Large, Volume 84, p. 904, Military Procurement Authoriza-
tion Act for 1971 , Public Law 91-441, Section 203, 1970.
72. Terleckyj, N.E. , Sources of Productivity Change, 1899-1953 > Columbia
University, i960.
73» Trueger, P.M., Accounting Guide for Defense Contractors , 4th edition,
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. , I963.
74. United Nations Basic Data (1970), provided by Dr. Robert von Pagen-
hardt, Professor of Political Science, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California
75* U.S. Congress, House Banking and Currency Committee Hearings, Amend-
ment to the Defense Production Act of 1950 » 90th Congress, 2nd
Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, I968.
76, U.S. Congress, Senate Bill S3003 i Congressional Record, 91st Congress,
1st Session, v.. 115 part 21, p. 29042-046, 8 October 1969.
77# U.S. Congress, Senate Banking and Currency Committee Hearings, Amend-
ment to the Defense Production Act of 1950 1 91st Congress, 2nd
Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.
78. U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, Authoriza-
tion for Military Procurement, Fiscal Year 1971 , 91st Congress,
2nd Session, Part 1, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.
79. U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, Authori za-
tion for Military Procurement, Fiscal Year 1971 > a^d. Reserve
Strength
,
91st Congress, 2nd Session, Part 3i U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970.
80. U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, Authori za-
tion for Military Procurement, Fiscal Year 1973 > 92nd Congress,
2nd Session, Part 2, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
168

81. U.S. Government, Special Analyses of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1973 > U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
82. U.S. Treasury Department, Regulations, Treasury Decision 5000, 19^0.
83. Vance, G.R. (Department of Defense), letter to R.W. Gutman (General
Accounting Office), subject: Basic Rationale for Government Reim-
bursement of IR&D Costs, 18 November 1964.
84. Ward, Barbara, and Dubos, Rene', Only One Earth
,
W.W. Norton, 1972.
85# Zimmerman, O.T. , "Productivity in Selected Industries," Cost Engi-
neering
,





1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Professor James M. Fremgen, Code 55 Fm i
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Professor J.W. Creighton, Code 55 Cf 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Commander Peter De Mayo, USN, Code 55 Dm 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940








8. LCDR R.S. Badgett, USN 2
U.S.S. Daniel Webster (SSBN 626) Blue
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96601
9. Mr. Elmer S. Bell 1
Cost Accounting Standards Board
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548
10. Library, Code 55 1






SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Dale Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTKBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
The Allowability and Allocability of Independent
Research and Development (iR&D) and Bid and
Proposal (B&P) Costs
5. TYPE OF REPORT 4 PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis; September
1973
6 PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORf*,)
Robert Samuel Badgett
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER'*;
9- PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^K)
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT. TASK
AREA 6 WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
172
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME « ADDRESSf// dlllerent from Controlling Office)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^
15. SECURITY CLASS, (ol thie report)
Unclassified
15«. DECLASSIFI CATION/' DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION ST ATEMEN T (of Oil a Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol the abatract entered in Block 30, il different from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reveroe aide it noceeaary and Identify by block number)
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on raverae aide if nacaaaary and Identity by block number)
For some time there has been controversy about and an increasing amount
of attention to business costs which have been labeled as independent re-
search and development (IR&D) and bid and proposal (B&P) costs. This thesis
examines these costs in order to bring clearer understanding to what they
are, why they are undertaken, how they are accounted for, and how they should
be managed and paid for. This is accomplished by reviewing the objectives of
IR&D and MP costs, examining the past and present environment in which these
DD ) jan*73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
(Page 1) S/N 0102-014-6601 I
171 SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

i'LCUKITY CL ASSIFICATION OF THIS PA&EfH'ben Dolt Entered)
20. (cont'd)
efforts have been and are being conducted, and identifying issues and pro-
blems confronting both industry and Government. Because the Department of
Defense is the largest Government procurer, emphasis is placed on its
policies and procedures and the effects they have on industry.
Research for this thesis was conducted by (l) review of related litera-
ture, (2) interviews with knowledgeable personnel, and (3) a questionnaire
which was sent to personnel in Government and industry who are directly in-
volved with these costs.
DD Form 1473 (BACK)
. 1 Jan 73









ent research and develop-




The allowability and alienability
of ind
3 2768 001 91126 6
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
